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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Kelley A Kinney*
Andrea West Wortzel**
I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews the key environmental developments at
the federal and state levels during the period from June 1996
to June 1998. Legislation and judicial decisions are presented
topically. Certain issues, such as public participation and envi-
ronmental justice, are playing an increasing role and will likely
impact all media.
II. WATER
Regulation of wastewater and drinking water has been im-
pacted by two emerging issues during the past two years. First,
citizen suits against the United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency ("EPA") relating to the development of state im-
paired waters listings' has led to increased attention on the
total maximum daily load process.' Second, watershed manage-
* Associate, McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe, L.L.P., Environmental Solutions
Group, Richmond, Virginia. B.S., 1994, University of Kentucky; J.D., 1997 Vermont
Law School; Masters of Studies in Environmental Law, 1998, Vermont Law School.
** Associate, McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe, L.L.P., Environmental Solutions
Group, Richmond, Virginia. BA, 1991, College of William and Mary; J.D., 1996, Uni-
versity of Richmond School of Law.
1. The Clean Water Act requires states to develop a list of waters that are im-
paired (i.e., not meeting water quality standards) every two years. See 33 U.S.C. §
1313(d) (1994).
2. Total maximum daily load (-TMDL") litigation has commenced in 25 states,
including Maryland, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Delaware and the District of Colum-
bia. The litigation invokes the failure of the EPA to require states to timely submit
their impaired waters listings and resulting total maximum daily loadings for those
waters. Citizen groups have filed notices of intent to sue in four additional states,
including Virginia. See TMDL Litigation by State (last modified Apr. 10, 1998)
<http-/www.epa.gov/OWOW/tmdl/lawsuitl.html>. TMDLs must be developed and im-
plemented for each impaired water segment. TMDLs allocate the amount and type of
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ment3 has become a common term in the field of water regula-
tion. The President's Clean Water Action Plan focuses on the
need to implement environmental programs on a watershed
basis.4 This concept has driven legislation and regulations for
wastewater and drinking water in Virginia.
A. Wastewater
1. Legislation
The Chesapeake Bay watershed has received a great deal of
publicity during the past decade.5 In 1983, Virginia, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia, the EPA, and the Ches-
apeake Bay Commission formally agreed to undertake the resto-
ration and protection of the bay using a cooperative, non-regu-
latory approach.6 A new bay agreement was signed in 1987'
and contained the goal of reducing the annual nutrient load8
discharges that may be made in that water segment. These allocations take on great-
er significance as growth occurs. The TMDL establishes the maximum quantitative
amount of a pollutant which may be released from point and nonpoint sources with-
out violating the state-established narrative and numerical water quality standards
("WQS"). See Diane K. Conway, TMDL Litigation: So Now What?, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
83, 92 (1997).
3. "Watershed management" is a regulatory framework that focuses on water
quality issues throughout a watershed. Environmental problems are dealt with in
hydrologically-defined geographic areas, taking into consideration both ground and
surface water flow. The focus is not solely on individual water bodies or dischargers.
See, e.g., Watershed Approach Framework (last modified July 17, 1996)
<http'//www.epa.gov/OWOW/watershed/framework.html>.
4. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN: RE-
STORING AND PROTECTING AMERICA'S WATERS 73-88 (1996).
5. See, e.g., Scott Harper, A Battered Bay: Virginia's Half of the Chesapeake Bay
Is Being Anxiously Watched for Water Quality Problems that Could Harm Oyster and
Crab Populations and Stymie a Recovery of Underwater Grasses, VIRGINIAN-PILOT &
LEDGER STAR, Apr. 3, 1996, at 1; Lawrence Latane III, Heavy Flow Burdened Bay
Cleanup Effort But EPA Predicts Water Quality Will Rebound, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH,
Sept. 9, 1995, at B1; Lawrence Latane III, Underwater Grasses Are Key to Chesa-
peake Water Quality, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 13, 1995, at AS.
6. See 1983 Chesapeake Bay Agreement (last modified Mar. 4, 1996)
<http://www.chesapeakebay.net/bayprogram/pubs/83agree.htm>.
7. See 1987 Chesapeake Bay Agreement (last modified Mar. 4, 1996)
<http'//www.chesapeakebay.net/bayprogram/pubs/87agree.htm>.
8. Nitrogen and phosphorus are nutrients that come from point sources
(wastewater treatment plants and industrial plants) and nonpoint sources (surface
runoff from farms, residential property, and other urban areas). High levels of nutri-
ents lead to increased algae populations which block light from reaching underwater
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reaching the main bay from controllable sources by forty per-
cent by the year 2000.
Amendments to the agreement in 1992 provided that the
forty percent goal be maintained beyond the year 2000 and that
tributaries upstream of the bay be integrated into the reduction
efforts.9 In response to the forty percent reduction goal, Virgin-
ia enacted legislation in 1996 setting a timetable for the devel-
opment of strategies for each of the tributaries feeding into the
Chesapeake Bay.'0 As the reduction deadline nears, Virginia is
witnessing an abundance of legislation aimed at assisting regu-
lated dischargers in meeting the forty percent reduction goal."
The Virginia Water Quality Improvement Act was passed in
1997, providing grant funding for up to fifty percent of the
project cost to municipalities implementing biological nutrient
removal projects. 2
In addition, legislation was passed to allow individuals, to
make voluntary monetary contributions to the Chesapeake Bay
restoration efforts through their tax return filings. 3 Funds
received through this program are credited to the Water Quali-
ty Improvement Fund.
Recognizing the vast degree of data collection still needed to
complete the strategies, the legislature extended the deadlines
for the development of strategies for the lower tributaries. 4
The York and James River Tributary Strategies were due July
1, 1998, and the deadline for the Tributary Strategy for the
-Rappahannock River was extended to January 1, 1999.' Ini-
tial strategies were published for public comment on July 1,
grasses. As algae die and sink to the bottom, their decay robs the water of oxygen
-which is essential for fish, shellfish, and other aquatic animals. See SHENANDOAH AND
PoToMAc RIVER BAsINs TRIBUTARY NUTRIENT REDUCTION STRATEGY, FINAL REPORT 3
(1996).
9. See 1992 Amendments to the Chesapeake Bay Agreement (last modified Mar. 4,
1996) <http-//www.chesapeakebay.net/bayprogram/pubs/92agree.htm>.
10. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-51.12:2 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
11. See, e.g., id. § 2.1-51.12:2 (Cum. Supp. 1998); id. §§ 10.1-2117 to -2134 (Repl.
Vol. 1998); id. § 58.1-346.7 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
12. See id. §§ 10.1-2117 to -2134 (Repl. Vol. 1998). Only those projects taking
place in tributaries with approved strategies are currently eligible. See id.
13. See id. § 58.1-346.7 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
14. See id. § 2.1-51.12:2(B) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
15. See id.
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1998, as well as a "Status Report" on the development of the
Rappahannock Tributary Strategy." The bill adds factors to be
considered in developing tributary plans, including the follow-
ing:
(i) studies relevant to the establishment of nutrient reduc-
tion goals; (ii) the relative contributions and impacts of
point and nonpoint sources of nutrients; (iii) the scientific
relationship between nutrient controls and the attainment
of water quality goals; and (iv) estimating compliance costs
for publicly owned treatment works affected by point source
nutrient reduction goals and estimates of costs for nonpoint
source nutrient reduction goals."7
To augment the Chesapeake Bay cleanup efforts, Virginia has
passed legislation to strengthen its ability to enforce require-
ments in the bay watershed. House Bill 275818 clarifies the
power of the Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Department
("CBLAD")"9 to bring or to intervene in legal and administra-
tive actions to ensure proper implementation, enforcement, and
compliance by local governments covered by the Chesapeake
Bay Preservation Act.2 °
Local governments have been authorized to incorporate cer-
tain penalty provisions into their ordinances, developed to pro-
tect water quality in Chesapeake Bay Preservation Areas.2
Civil penalties may be assessed by a court for up to $5,000 per
day of violation." Alternatively, a local government may issue
an order against a violator for the one-time payment of civil
charges for each violation in specific sums, not to exceed
$10,000 for each violation. The local government orders may
only be issued with the alleged violator's consent. The civil
16. See Virginia Chesapeake Bay Program (last modified July 6, 1998)
<httpJ/www.deq.state.va.uslenvprog/bay.html>.
17. VA. CODE ANN § 2.1-51.12:2 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
18. H.B. 2758, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1997) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
10.1-2103, -2104, -2106 (Repl. Vol. 1998)).
19. The Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act created the CBLAD to assist the Ches-
apeake Bay Local Assistance Board in providing land use development and water
protection information and assistance to state, regional, and local governments. See
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-2100 to -2115 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
20. See id.
21. See id. § 10.1-2109 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
22. See id. § 10.1-2109(E)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1998).
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charges are in lieu of civil penalties and may be added to the
cost of any restoration required or ordered by the local govern-
ing body or official.'
The emphasis on the Chesapeake Bay also has led to re-
newed efforts to reduce nonpoint source pollution from agricul-
tural sources, on both national and state levels.24 House Bill
807' requires the Department of Environmental Quality
("DEQ") Director to establish a Clean Water Farm Award Pro-
gram to recognize farms in Virginia using practices designed to
protect water quality and soil resources. Farmers must be fully
implementing a nutrient management plan in order to be eligi-
ble for recognition.
New requirements for the preparation of the annual Toxic
Release Inventory published by DEQ were passed." The State
Water Control Board ("Board") must report annually on the sta-
tus of its efforts to reduce the level of toxic substances in state
waters.'
Water legislation focusing on the development of the state's
303(d) and 305(b) lists also was passed.' The legislation re-
23. See id. § 10.1-2109(EX2) (Repl. Vol. 1998).
24. See Gail .S. Shane, Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations: Will Increased
Enforcement and More Stringent Regulations Under the Clean Water Act Adequately
Protect Public Health and the Environment?, 13 NAAG NAfL ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J.
1, Apr. 1998, available in WESTLAW, TP-ALL Database.
25. H.B. 807, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
10.1-104.3 (Repl. Vol. 1998)).
26. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.17:2 to :3 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
27. See id. The report must include the following information:.
1. [clompliance data on permits that have toxics limits; 2. [t]he number
of new permits or reissued permits that have toxic limits and the loca-
tion of each permitted facility; 3. [tlhe location and number of monitoring
stations and the period of time that monitoring has occurred at each
location; 4. [a] summary of pollution prevention and pollution control
activities for the reduction of toics in state waters; 5. [s]ampling results
from the monitoring stations for the previous year; and 6. [t]he Board's
plan for continued reduction of the discharge of toxics which shall in-
clude, but not be limited to, additional monitoring activities, a work plan
for the pollution prevention program, and any pilot projects established
for the use of innovative technologies to reduce the discharge of toxics.
Id. § 62.1-44.17:3(B) (Repl. Vol. 1998).
28. See id. §§ 62.1-44.19:4 to :8 (Repl. Vol. 1998). The states are required to sub-
mit a listing of waters that are impaired (i.e., not meeting water quality standards)
to the EPA every two years. See 33 U.S.C. § 1212(d) (1994). This list is commonly re-
ferred to as the 303(d) list. States are also required to provide the EPA with a sum-
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quires that the 303(d) and 305(b) reports provide information
on trends in water quality for specific and easily identifiable,
geographically defined water segments. Additionally, the reports
now must provide a basis for developing initiatives and pro-
grams to address current and potential water quality impair-
ments. Accurate and comparable data for each water segment is
required so that the reports reflect water quality that is repre-
sentative of the state as a whole.29
These requirements already have had an impact on the de-
velopment of the 1998 303(d) list.3 For example, data from
the preceding five years must be used, rather than from only
the two prior years. Also, increased monitoring, both in terms
of the number of water miles monitored and the amount and
type of monitoring data generated, must be implemented.1
Waters must now be listed as impaired if there is evidence of
"(i) violations of ambient water quality standards or human
health standards; (ii) fishing restrictions or advisories; (iii)
shellfish consumption restrictions due to contamination; (iv)
nutrient over-enrichment; (v) significant declines in aquatic life
biodiversity or populations; or (vi) contamination of sediment at
levels which violate water quality standards or threaten aquatic
life or human health."32 The new legislative requirements for
developing the lists have resulted in an increase in the number
of water segments included on the 1998 303(d) list, as com-
pared to the 1996 list.33
Citizen right-to-know provisions are also significantly impact-
ed by the legislation.34 Notices must be posted at public access
points to all toxic-impaired waters. 5 A citizen hotline must. be
maintained so that citizens can "receive information about the
mary of water quality conditions throughout the state every two years. See id. §
1315(b). The report summarizes data from the previous five years and is referred to
as the 305(b) list. See id.
29. See VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.19:5(A)(v) (Repl. Vol. 1998).
30. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF ENVTL. QuALITY & DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION
AND RECREATION, VIRGINA 303(D) TOTAL MAXmum DAILY LOAD PRIORITY LIST AND
REPORT DRAFr 3-5 (1998) [hereinafter PRIORITY LIST AND REPORT].
31. See id at 4.
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.19:5(C)(1)(i)-(iv) (Repl. Vol. 1998).
33. See PRIORITY LIST AND REPORT, supra note 30, at 9.
34. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.19:4 to :8 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
35. See id. § 62.1-44.19:6(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1998).
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condition of waterways, including information on toxics, toxic
discharges, permit violations and other water quality related
issues.""5 Information about discharges that may be detrimen-
tal to the public health or may impair beneficial uses of state
waters must be published in a local newspaper.
Once the 303(d) list is complete, the Board must develop and
implement a plan to achieve "fully supporting" status for im-
paired waters, except where the impairment is established as
naturally occurring.3 Addressing toxic impairment is of partic-
ular concern. Owners of establishments that discharge toxics to
toxic-impaired waters must evaluate the options for controlling
such discharges.
Legislation was introduced during the past two General As-
sembly sessions proposing to increase water permit fees dras-
tically. In 1997, the legislation would have required the Board
to develop guidelines to ensure that the amount of permit fees
would cover fifty percent of the water program's direct and
indirect costs.39 The bills, through amendments, were convert-
ed into a study of the DEQ water program costs and the degree
of permit fee increases needed to cover those costs. As a result
of the 1997 study,' legislators again introduced bills in 1998
proposing to increase permit fees so that 100% of the water
program costs would be recovered. The increases would be
phased in until July 1, 2003."' The 1998 legislation, however,
was also defeated. As in 1997, however, a study bill was in-
troduced requesting the Auditor of Public Accounts to review
the DEQ's water program costs and to determine whether per-
mit fees would adequately cover those costs.4 2 It is likely that
36. Id. § 62.1-44.19:6(A)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1998).
37. See id. § 62.1-44.19:6(B) (Repl. Vol. 1998).
38. The plan shall include the date of expected achievement of water quality
objectives, measurable goals, the corrective actions necessary, and the associated costs,
benefits and environmental impact of addressing impairment and the expeditious
development and implementation of TMDLs when appropriate. A priority ranking for
impaired waters should be developed as part of the plan. See id.
39. See S.B. 1080 & H.B. 2245, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1997) (amending
and reenacting VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15:6 (Repl. Vol. 1998)).
40. See DEPARTMENT OF ENVTL. QUALITY, EVALUATION OF THE PERMIT FEE PRO-
GRAi, REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1998).
41. See S.B. 597 & H.B. 1394, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998).
42. See H.B. 30, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998).
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legislation will be introduced again next year based on the
study results.
In the interest of communities' right-to-know, legislation was
introduced to amend the notification requirements associated
with application for a new or modified Virginia Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System ("VPDES") permit.' The Board
must make a good faith effort to notify, in writing, each locality
and riparian property owner impacted by the permit applica-
tion." Upon public notice of an enforcement action under the
State Water Control Law, the Board must provide written infor-
mation regarding the alleged violation to the locality where the
offense has or is taking place.4"
Additionally, the General Assembly passed resolutions re-
questing the DEQ, the Department of Forestry, and the Depart-
ment of Conservation and Recreation ("DCR") to provide leader-
ship and necessary guidance to citizen groups monitoring the
water quality of Virginia's rivers and streams.4" The
legislature's intent is for the Departments to ensure the data
collected by these groups is valid and reliable.
In response to this legislation, the DEQ has entered into a
letter of agreement with the Virginia Division Izaak Walton
League of America, Virginia Save Our Streams Program.4" In
the agreement, the DEQ committed to using water monitoring
43. A VPDES permit is issued by the DEQ and authorizes (i) the discharge of
pollutants from a point source to surface waters, and (ii) the use or disposal of sew-
age sludge. See 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE 25-31-10 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
44. See VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15:4(B) (Repl. Vol. 1998). For tidal waters, the
notification must extend to localities and riparian property owners "to a distance one
quarter mile downstream and one quarter mile upstream or to the fall line whichever
is closer." For non-tidal waters, notification is due "each locality and riparian property
owner to a distance one half mile downstream .... If the receiving river, at the
point or proposed point of discharge, is two miles wide or greater, the riparian prop-
erty owners on the opposite shore need not be notified." Id. § 62.1-44.15:4(D) (Repl.
Vol. 1998).
45. See id. § 62.1-44.15:4(E) (Repl. Vol. 1998).
46. See H.J. Res. 118, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998); H.J. Res. 159, Va.
Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998). House Joint Resolution 118 goes further than House
Joint Resolution 159, encouraging the DEQ and DCR to provide all possible coopera-
tion and assistance to citizen volunteers and to expand voluntary stewardship of
Virginia's waters.
47. See Letter of Agreement Between the Department of Environmental Quality
and the Virginia Division Izaak Walton League of America, Virginia Save Our
Streams Program (Apr. 29, 1998) (on file with author).
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data generated by the group in developing the 305(b) report
and for other appropriate uses." The agreement establishes
training and quality control procedures to be followed in order
for the data to be used.49
The Virginia General Assembly also passed legislation fo-
cused on the quality of data gathered as part of the water per-
mit program.' ° The Division of Consolidated Laboratory Servic-
es must develop a program for the certification of laboratories
conducting any tests, analyses, measurements, or moiitoring
required under the Virginia Waste Management Act or State
Water Control Law.5 The regulations are not to be promulgat-
ed until national accreditation standards by the National Envi-
ronmental Laboratory Accreditation Conference have been
adopted.52
Two new types of general permits will be created because of
recent legislation. House Bill 2107"' requires the Board to co-
ordinate the development of a general permit for the installa-
tion of certain water quality improvement and protection prac-
tices. For this general permit to apply, the activity must be (i)
covered by a Corps of Engineers general permit, (ii) designed
and supervised by a soil and water conservation district, (iii)
consistent with specified design standards, and (iv) intended to
improve water quality.' The purpose of the general permit is
to expedite the use of water quality improvement projects.55
Accordingly, the Virginia Marine Resources Commission must
develop a process to accelerate the issuance of general permits
for such projects.56
The second general permit category applies to discharges of
stormwater and process wastewater from industrial activities
48. See id. at 6.
49. See id. at 3-5.
50. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-429.01 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
51. See iUd
52. See id
53. H.B. 2107, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1997) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
9-6.14:4.1, 28.2-103, 28.2-1207, 62.1-44.15:5.1 (Repl. Vol. 1998)).
54. See VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15:5.1 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
55. See id.
56. See id. The activities intended to be covered by such a general permit include
bioengineered streambank projects and livestock stream crossings. See id.
12251998]
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associated with the manufacture of ready-mix concrete. 7 The
permit would apply to both permanent and portable concrete
plants. The general permit may include a requirement that
settling basins for the treatment and control of process
wastewater and commingled stormwater be lined with concrete
or other impermeable materials. This requirement will apply to
settling basins constructed on or after February 2, 1998.58
2. Case law
On the enforcement side, the regulated community was dis-
mayed at the recent decision in United States v. Smithfield
Foods, Inc." Essentially, the decision allowed the EPA to en-
force state permit limits, in spite of the fact that the state had
issued a consent order providing a schedule for achieving com-
pliance and relieving Smithfield Foods, Inc. ("Smithfield") from
any liability in the interim." The EPA brought an enforcement
action against Smithfield in federal district court.for submitting
required reports late and for violating effluent limitations con-
tained in its VPDES permit.6 Smithfield was operating under
a VPDES permit which contained limits for phosphorus, nitro-
gen, CBOD, cyanide, and ammonia that it was unable to
meet. 2 The defendant alleged that the DEQ had issued a spe-
cial order granting Smithfield a reprieve from the permit limits
if Smithfield agreed to connect its discharge to the Hampton
Roads Sanitation District." The court awarded the highest
penalty in the history of the Clean Water Act to the EPA, find-
ing that Smithfield had over 164 permit violations.' This
award was based on the court's finding that the special orders
of the DEQ were not incorporated into the permit, nor did they
condition, revise, supersede, alter, modify, or change the terms
57. See id. § 62.1-44.15:5.2 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
58. See id.
59. 965 F. Supp. 769 (E.D. Va. 1997).
60. See id. at 785-87.
61. See id. at 781.
62. See id. at 783. The limits were based on state standards that were more
stringent than the federal requirements. See id. at 774.
63. See id. at 784.
64. See id. at 796.
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of the permit.' State-issued consent orders do not bind the
EPA unless the Agency is a party to the agreements or the
Agency consents to being bound."
The court concluded that the DEQ's state enforcement action
did not preclude the EPA from bringing an enforcement action
because Virginia's enforcement powers were not comparable to
those found in section 309 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA). 6 7
Virginia's State Water Control Law' was found to be deficient
in two respects: (i) the DEQ's ability to assess administrative
penalties; and (ii) the public's participation rights. The district
court went on to treble the damages.s9
This case is significant because Smithfield had an ongoing
relationship with the state agency and was operating under a
consent decree for which the EPA had received notice and an
opportunity to comment. Nonetheless, the court found the EPA
was not bound by the consent decree and could seek indepen-
dent enforcement against Smithfield."°
Several recent decisions outside the Fourth Circuit also could
impact water pollution regulation in Virginia. The Fifth Circuit
recently held that the EPA cannot require a state to engage in
Endangered Species Act consultations in order to receive dele-
gation to administer the NPDES permit program. In American
Forest & Paper Ass'n v. EPA,' Louisiana applied to the EPA
for authority to administer its NPDES permit program. As a
condition for receiving delegation, the EPA required that Louisi-
ana consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") and the
National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") before issuing
65. See id. at 787.
66. See id. at 788-91. Smithfield filed a cross-bill seeking a declaratory judgment
that the special order revised and superseded its permit. See, Treacy v. Smithfield
Foods, Inc., 256 Va. 97, 500 S.E.2d 503 (1998). The Supreme Court of Virginia re-
fused to issue a judgment on the grounds that there was no controversy between the
DEQ and Smithfield. Both parties agreed that the VPDES permit was superseded by
the special order for purposes of a state enforcement action. However, federal law
would govern the determination of whether the special order precluded an enforce-
ment action brought by the EPA. Smithfield's dispute was with the EPA, not the
DEQ. See id.
67. See Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. at 787.
68. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.2 to 44.34:12 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
69. See Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. at 792-95.
70. See id. at 792-93.
71. 137 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 1998).
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permits. The EPA reserved the right to veto permits that were
not modified in response to the comments provided by the FWS
and NMFS. The court found that the EPA must approve a state
permit program if it meets the nine requirements spelled out in
section 402 of the CWA. The protection of endangered species is
not a listed requirement. Accordingly, the EPA could not re-
quire Endangered Species Act reviews as a condition of delega-
tion to administer the NPDES program.72
A United States District Court in Washington called into
question EPA regulations allowing state revisions to water
quality standards to take immediate effect.73 In Alaska Clean
Water Alliance v. Clarke, Alaska submitted revisions to its
water quality standards to the EPA for approval.74 Under sec-
tion 303(c)(3) of the CWA, the EPA must either notify a state
within sixty days if the revisions have been approved or within
ninety days if they have been disapproved. 5 The EPA regula-
tions, however, provide that state water quality standards go
into effect immediately upon adoption by a state and remain
effective until revised by the state, even if the EPA does not
approve the standard at the end of the review process.76 Envi-
ronmental groups brought suit against the EPA, challenging the
regulation.
Applying the traditional test of agency regulatory authority
set forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,77 the court found that Congress did not intend
for new or revised state water quality standards to become
effective until after the EPA had reviewed and approved
them.78 If this holding is adopted in Virginia, there could be a
significant impact on the development and implementation of
state water quality standards. Virginia is in the process of re-
vising its water quality standards, and new standards will be
72. See id.
73. See Alaska Clean Water Alliance v. Clarke, No. C96-1762R, 1997 WL 446499,
at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 8, 1997) (considering 40 C.F.R. § 131.21(C) (1997)).
74. See id. at *1.
75. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3) (1994).
76. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.21(c) (1997).
77. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
78. See Alaska Clean Water Alliance, 1997 WL 446499, at *3.
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implemented without the EPA's review and approval, despite
the Alaska Clean Water Alliance decision.
The Third Circuit recently decided a case that could affect
the ability of citizen groups to bring suit in the Clean Water
Act context.79 In Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey,
Inc. v. Magnesium Electron, Inc., Magnesium Electron appealed
the district court's ruling granting standing to the Public Inter-
est Research Group ("PIRG").' The appeal was brought after
the district court found that the permit violations in question
had caused no environmental harm and posed no threat to the
waterway in question. The Third Circuit held that .the CWA
does not authorize citizen suits where there has been no show-
ing of injury or threat of injury.8 Permit limit violations alone
are not sufficient to make this showing. This case could have a
tremendous impact on the ability of environmental groups to
bring suit for environmental violations that do not have a prov-
en detrimental impact.
B. Drinking Water
High profile water supply disputes such as the Lake Gaston
Pipeline litigation82 and the King William County reservoir
controversy' have lead to increased attention to water supply
planning in Virginia. Legislation considered by the General
Assembly during the past two years reflects this trend. Several
79. See Public Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium Electron, Inc.,
123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir. 1997).
80. See id. at 114.
81. See id at 120.
82. See, e.g., Karen Weintraub, Mediation May End Gaston Fight: Virginia Beach,
North Carolina Could Find Settlement on Pipeline Without the Help of Lawsuits, VIR-
GINIAN-PIOT & LEDGER-STAR, Mar. 20, 1995, at B1; Gilmore Files Court Papers Op-
posing North Carolina on Pipeline, RICH. TiMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 11, 1997, at B4; The
EPA and Lake Gaston: Not Quite a Go-Ahead, VIRGINIAN PILOT & LEDGER-STAR, Mar.
15, 1995, at A10.
83. See, e.g., Lawrence Latane M, Mattaponi Tribe Asks Court to Block Reservoir
Project, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 14, 1998, at B4; Lawrence Latane III, Reservoir
Project Faces Legal Challenge: Environmentalists Oppose State Permit, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, Jan. 16, 1998, at Bi; Lawrence Latane I, Water Project in Doubt: Study
Questions Newport News' Needs, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, May 30, 1998, at Al.
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resolutions were passed during the 1997 and 1998 General
Assembly sessions proposing studies aimed at protecting
Virginia's water resources."
The State Water Commission85 has been tasked with study-
ing the feasibility of using different methods for maximizing
Virginia's water resources."8 The resolution outlines various
water supply strategies for consideration, including water recy-
cling, desalinization, tertiary treatment, and conservation.
s 7
House Joint Resolution 58788 required the Department of
Environmental Quality and Department of Health to study
examples of water reuse and conservation programs throughout
the United States. The focus of the study was to evaluate pos-
sible health effects from water reuse and the feasibility of im-
plementing such programs in Virginia. 9 Additionally, the
study proposed guidelines for appropriate gray water 0 reuse in
Virginia and made recommendations on incentives to encourage
rainwater collection and gray water reuse among targeted audi-
ences. A report was provided to the General Assembly at the
start of the 1998 Session.91
As a result of this study, the 1998 General Assembly passed
legislation requiring the Department of Health, in conjunction
with the DEQ, to develop guidelines by January 1, 1999, re-
garding the use of gray and rain water.92 The guidelines are'
intended to promote the use of rain water and gray water to
84. See, e.g., H.J. Res. 274, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998); H.J. Res. 273,
Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998); H.J. Res. 272, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess.
1998); H.J. Res. 236, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998); H.J. Res. 592, Va. Gen.
Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1997); H.J. Res. 587, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1997); H.J.
Res. 554, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1997).
85. The State Water Commission was formed to study water supply issues in
Virginia and make recommendations for legislative changes relating to water supply.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 9-145.8 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
86. See H.J. Res. 236, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998).
87. See id.
88. See H.J. Res. 587, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1997).
89. See id.
90. Gray water is water that is domestic wastewater from sink, shower, dish-
washer, and laundry drains. See How To Conserve Water and Use It Effectively (visit-
ed July 14, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/watrhomeyouchap3.html>.
91. See DEPARTMENT OF ENVT'L QUALITY & DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, GRAY WA-
TER USE AND RAIN WATER CAPTURE (1997).
92. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-248.2 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
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reduce fresh water consumption, ease demands on public
treatment works and water supply systems, and promote con-
servation."
In similar legislation passed in 1997, the State Water Com-
mission was directed to work with the Virginia Water Resourc-
es Research Center to study innovative technologies and other
options for addressing the need to provide safe drinking water
to homes in southwestern Virginia.9 Innovative technologies to
be considered include "water harvesting and cistern storage,
small surface reservoirs, and cost-effective treatment, including
the development of small package-system models."95 The re-
sults of the two-year study will be reported to the 1999 General
Assembly.
Reauthorization of the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA) 96
in 1996 has led to additional legislative changes. The Virginia
Code was amended to provide the Health Department with the
new penalty powers created by the SDWA.97 After a hearing,
the Health Department is now able to issue special orders for
waterworks violations, including civil penalties of not more than
$1,000 per day of violation.98
Access to the Virginia Water Supply Revolving Fund 9 was
broadened to include all owners of drinking water systems,
whether local governments or individuals, partnerships ,or cor-
porations, so long as the waterworks serves an average of twen-
ty-five individuals for at least sixty days out of the year or has
at least fifteen connections.' The bill also clarifies the rela-
tionship between the State Board of Health and the Virginia
Resources Authority ("VRA") with respect to administration of
the Fund. The State Board of Health (i) may require status
reports from VRA, (ii) must reimburse VRA for its reasonable
93. See id.
94. See H.J. Res. 592, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1997).
95. Id.
96. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (1994).
97. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-167 to -176 (Repl. Vol. 1997); id. § 32.1-175.01
(Cum. Supp. 1998).
98. See id. § 32.1-175.01 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
99. Id. §§ 62.1-233 to -241 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
100. See id.
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costs and expenses, and (iii) shall approve a fee for VRA's man-
agement services.'
In response to water supply issues in southwest Virginia, coal
bed methane well operators are now required to replace domes-
tic water supplies contaminated by the operation, if the supply
is located within 750 feet of the operation. 10 2 The new water
supply must be capable of meeting pre-contamination uses."
Such replacement, however, is not required if the property own-
er refuses to allow the operator access to the property to sam-
ple the well water in order to verify the contamination.'
Additionally, legislation was passed allowing property owners
to object to a coal bed methane permit if the well or pipeline
will unreasonably infringe on the owner's use of the surface." 5
The objection can be granted only if a reasonable alternative
site is available within the unit and granting the objection will
not :materially impair any right contained in an agreement
between the property owner and the operator.'
C. Stormwater
The EPA was instructed to implement a comprehensive ap-
proach to stormwater regulation in 1987.07 As part of this ap-
proach, regulations have been developed and implemented for
large and medium sources of stormwater' 5 Most recently,
EPA has proposed its Stormwater Phase II rule, - which would
apply to small municipal separate storm sewer systems"9 lo-
cated in urban areas and to construction activities that disturb
between one and five acres of land."0
101. See id. § 62.1-234 (Repi. Vol. 1998).
102. See id. §§ 45.1-361.43, -361.44 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
103. See id.
104. The coal bed methane well operator may enter the property at reasonable
times and in a reasonable manner to obtain samples of water from the wells. See id.
105. See id. § 45.1-361.35 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
106. See id.
107. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994).
108. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 63 Fed. Reg. 1536,
1542-43 (1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122) (proposed Jan. 9, 1998).
109. See id. at 1551. Small municipal separate storm sewer systems serve popu-
lations less than 100,000. See id. at 1546.
110. See id. at 1551.
1232
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The proposed Stormwater Phase II rule would change the
NPDES stormwater permit application regulations under the
CWA to establish a sequential application process for all Phase
II stormwater discharges. Phase II stormwater dischargers
would be required to apply for permits by August 7, 2001,"'
and to implement stormwater discharge management controls.
The proposed rule encourages the use of general permits,
allows municipalities to determine the nature of their own
stormwater controls, and encourages the use of watershed ap-
proaches. Certain sources would be eligible for waivers based on
TMDL and watershed-based waiver provisions."' Owners and
operators of all categories of industrial activities that are able
to certify that their industrial materials will have "no exposure"
to stormwater will be exempt as well."' The Phase II rule is
expected to become final in March 1999. Permits will be issued
under the program in March 2002.
On the state level, there have been some minor changes to
stormwater regulation. Localities are now allowed to exempt
cemeteries from local stormwater management fees."' Addi-
tionally, localities must now waive stormwater service charges
for roads that are owned and maintained by government agen-
cies."5
IH. AIR
A. Federal Initiatives
The EPA undertook several ambitious air pollution initiatives
in 1997 that will affect both the standards and compliance
obligations of sources in Virginia. Significantly, the EPA recent-
ly tightened the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
("NAAQS")"6  for ozone" and particulate matter."' The
111. See id. at 1636.
112. See id, at 1553-54.
113. See id. at 1597.
114. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2114 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
115. See id.
116. The EPA is required, pursuant to section 109 of the Clean Air Act, to estab-
lish NAAQS for specified pollutants. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1994). Section 110 of the
Act then imposes the burden on states to implement the measures to be applied to
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EPA revised the ozone standard from 0.12 parts per million
("ppm") over a one-hour average to 0.08 ppm over an eight-hour
average" 9 to protect against longer exposure periods. 20 The
Agency also targeted fine particles, 2.5 microns or less in diam-
eter, in the promulgation of new standards for particulate mat-
ter ("PM"). Fine particles, which generally stem from industrial
and residential combustion or vehicle exhaust, have been linked
to health problems also associated with exposure to ozone, such
as asthma 2' and visibility impairment."2 The new PM 2.5
standards are a twenty-four-hour average of 50ug/m3 and an
annual average limit of 15ugm. 1" These controversial
NAAQS have been the subject of both industry challenges based
on the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
("SBREFA'7) 4 and legislative challenges" that have the po-
tential of delaying implementation of the NAAQS for years.
In conjunction with the promulgation of the new particulate
matter NAAQS, the EPA recently proposed Regional Haze Reg-
ulations aimed at improving visibility26 in the nation's pris-
tine areas, such as the Shenandoah Valley."' The proposal
sources necessary to attain NAAQS through State Implementation Plans ("SIPs"). See
42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1994).
117. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856
(1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50).
118. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 61 Fed.
Reg. 65,638 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (proposed Dec. 13, 1996).
119. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. at
38,861.
120. Long-term exposure to ambient ozone concentration has been linked to chronic
health effects such as structural damage to lung tissue and accelerated decline in
baseline lung function. See id. at 38,859 & n.4.
121. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 61 Fed.
Reg. at 65,640.
122. See id. at 65,662.
123. See id. at 65,638.
124. See 5 U.S.C. § 611 (1996).
125. See H.R. 1984, 105th Cong. (1997) (providing for a four-year moratorium on
the establishment of the new ozone and particulate matter standards pending further
implementation of the CAA amendments of 1990 and additional review under the
Act).
126. The regulations would also protect against effects such as soiling and material
damage. See id.
127. See Regional Haze Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 41,138 (1997) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 51) (proposed July 31, 1997). The EPA is proposing the Regional Haze
Regulations pursuant to section 169 of the CAA which sets forth "as a national goal
the prevention of any future, and the remedying of any existing, impairment of visi-
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calls for presumptive "reasonable progress targets"" for im-
proving visibility in pristine areas to be set and implemented
through State Implementation Plan ("SIP") revisions."2
As another component of the EPA's ozone control strategy,
the EPA formally issued a call for revised Clean Air Act
("CAA") SIPs for twenty-two eastern states,30 including Vir-
ginia. The call requires the states to reduce NOx"' emissions
by 1.6 million tons over the next eight years.' The proposal
requires the Commonwealth to achieve a NOx-reduction bud-
getm as a way to reduce ozone transport into the northeast.
Virginia will be required, through an amendment to its SIP, to
demonstrate how, and from what sources, it will meet this NOx
reduction goal."M Emissions controls would need to be in place
by 2002, and the proposed reductions achieved by 2005." The
burden of Virginia's proposed NOx reductions would fall primar-
ily on coal-burning power plants and large and medium-sized
boilers. 3 ' The proposed NOx reductions could result in signifi-
cant regional growth and development burdens in the Common-
bility in mandatory class I Federal areas which impairment results from man-made
air pollution." 42 U.S.C. § 7491 (1994).
128. Regional Haze Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. at 41,145.
129. See id. at 41,148.
130. These states include: Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia. See Information on the Proposed Rule for
Reducing Regional Transport of Ground-Level Ozone (Smog) (visited July 14, 1998)
<http:/www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/otagsip.html>.
131. NOx is a significant precursor to the formation of ozone. See Finding of Sig-
nificant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport As-
sessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 62
Fed. Reg. 60,318 (1997) (to be codified at 40 CFR pt. 52).
132. See id.
133. Virginia's proposed 2007 NOx reduction budget would require the Common-
wealth to achieve a 21% reduction in NOx emissions. See EPA Proposal Calls on 22
States to Cut NOx Emissions by 1.6 Million Tons Per Year, [Oct.] Daily Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 198, at AA-1, AA-2 (Oct. 14, 1997).
134. The EPA plans to promulgate its rule on the regional reductions in Septem-
ber 1998, and states are required to submit their revised SIPs in 1999. See id. at
AA-1.
135. See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in
the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional
Transport of Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 60,318, 60,367 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 52).
136. See id. at 60,320.
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wealth due to the increased costs of energy and technology
necessary to achieve reductions, as well as the increased diffi-
culty in building new sources or expanding upon existing sourc-
es.
The EPA has also added two weapons to its clean air enforce-
ment arsenal which will have implications for sources through-
out the Commonwealth of Virginia. The EPA is seeking,
through the adoption in 1996 of new monitoring rules 3 and
the adoption in 1997 of the Any Credible Evidence Rule
("ACE"),1" to ensure continuous compliance with CAA require-
ments. The Compliance Assurance Monitoring Rule ("CAM")
enhances monitoring requirements for sources that rely on
pollution control devices..9 to achieve compliance with applica-
ble CAA requirements and for sources that use other methods
to meet emission limits." Sources that use -control devices
would be required to monitor the operation and maintenance of
their pollution control equipment and to correct and report any
instances of equipment malfunction.'
In addition, the 1997 ACE Rule'42 provides a strong exam-
ple of the EPA's efforts to expand its enforcement authority.
Traditionally, the EPA was limited to established performance
and reference test'" data for use in establishing CAA viola-
tions.'" Such tests, which were promulgated through public
rulemakings, were designed to ensure that the determination of
compliance was linked directly to the underlying data which
gave rise to the emission limit.'" In contrast, the ACE rule
137. See Compliance Assurance Monitoring, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,900 (1997) (to be codi-
fled at 40 C.F.R. pts. 64, 70, 71).
138. See Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. 8314 (1997) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60, 61).
139. The CAM rule defines a "control device" as a piece of "equipment that re-
moves pollutants or transforms pollutants to passive emissions.' Compliance Assur-
ance Monitoring, 62 Fed. Reg. at 54,902.
140. An "emission limitation or standard" includes any federally enforceable emis-
sion limitation, emission standard, standard of performance, or means of emission
limitation as defined under the Clean Air Act. See id. at 54,909.
141. See Fact Sheet: Compliance Assurance Monitoring (last modified Oct. 3, 1997)
<http//www.epa.gov/ttn/uatw/cam/camprfs.html>.
142. See Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8314.
143. See 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60, 61 (1997).
144. See Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8315.
145. See Michael G. Dowd & Michael H. Levin, By Any Credible Means: Any Cred-
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has now increased the types of evidence available to establish
CAA violations. Evidence such as routine monitoring, continu-
ous emissions monitoring results, opacity tests, engineering
calculations, witness testimony, or virtually any other evidence
now theoretically can be used to establish noncompliance.'
In effect, the ACE rule has done away with accepted emission
standards and left federal and state rules of evidence as the
only limits on what information can be used to establish viola-
tions.
Sources have directed sharp criticism at the rule for both
changing the definition of compliance and for exposing sources
to an increased number of public and private actions by allow-
ing a source's own records to be used against them.47 Faced
with these concerns, sources will be increasingly reluctant to
generate additional data, even in efforts to improve pollution
control, because that data could be used as evidence of a viola-
tion. The potential impact of this controversial rule has led to
one of the largest regulatory challenges ever levied against a
CAA provision.'
A current debate exists as to what extent state audit privi-
lege laws will be available as a shield against the EPA's ex-
panding access to information pursuant to the CAM and ACE
provisions. A war has been raging between the EPA and the
states regarding the scope of state environmental audit privi-
lege and immunity policy."' Virginia has adopted privilege
and immunity legislation that protects from disclosure docu-
ments generated as the product of a voluntary environmental
assessment. The privilege grants immunity from civil and ad-
ministrative penalties to anyone voluntarily disclosing violations
of environmental statutes, rules, or regulations. 5 ' The EPA
ible Evidence' Rule Radically Redefines Clean Air Act Compliance, LEGAL TIMES, June
16, 1997, at 533.
146. See Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. at 8315.
147. See Daniel Riesel, Forecasting Significant Air Act Implementation Issues: Per-
mitting and Enforcement, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 129, 155 (1996).
148. More than 80 petitions for review have been filed in the United States Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See Dowd & Levin, supra note 145, at 533.
149. See E. Lynn Grayson & Christina M. Riewer, EPA's Audit Policy and State
Audit-Privilege Laws: Moving Beyond Command and Control?, [1997] 27 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,243 (May 1997).
150. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1198, -1199 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
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has indicated, at least with respect to Title V permit program
enforcement authority, that Virginia's audit law will not inter-
fere with requisite enforcement authority. 5' Virginia may,
however, still be subject to pressures from EPA regarding other
delegated or impending delegated programs.'52
B. Virginia Judicial Developments
In October of 1996, Virginia asked the Supreme Court of the
United States to review the decision of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Virginia v. Browner." In
that decision, the court found that the EPA had properly disap-
proved Virginia's program for the issuance of air pollution per-
mits."M Specifically, the EPA disapproved of Virginia's submit-
tal because of inadequate judicial standing provisions and Title
V program fee provisions.'55 Also, Virginia failed to assure the
EPA that all sources required by the CAA to obtain Title V
permits would be required to attain operating permits.5 '
On January 21, 1997, the United States Supreme Court de-
clined to hear Virginia's case.' Virginia had prepared for this
possibility by passing an acceptable judicial standing law that
would become effective in the event the Supreme Court did not
overturn EPA's disapproval of the Virginia program.'58
Virginia's revised standing provisions 59 did "away with re-
quirements that a petitioner must demonstrate a pecuniary in-
151. See Clean Air Act Interim Approval of Operating Permit Program; Common-
wealth of Virginia, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,778, 12,785 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
70) (proposed Mar. 18, 1997).
152. The EPA has expressed concerns with the effect that Virginia's Environmental
Assessment Privilege and Immunity Law would have on programs such as the Public
Water Supply Supervision ("PWSS") program. See Letter from Neil R. Bigioni, Assis-
tant Regional Counsel, EPA Region I, to Roger L. Chaffe, Virginia Senior Assistant
Attorney General (Sept. 4, 1997) (on file with the author).
153. 80 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 764 (1997).
154. See id. at 883.
155. See id. at 880.
156. See Clean Air Act Proposed Disapproval of Operating Permit Program; Com-
monwealth of Virginia, 60 Fed. Reg. 48,435 (1995) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70).
157. See Virginia v. Browner, 117 S. Ct. 764 (1997).
158. See Clean Air Act Interim Approval of Operating Permits Program; Common-
wealth of Virginia, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,778, 12,780 (1997) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70).
159. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1318, 10.1-1485, 62.1-44.29 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
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terest to have standing.'" Instead, standing now exists for
anyone meeting the standard for judicial review of a "case or
controversy pursuant to Article III of the United States Con-
stitution.""' Virginia corrected the other deficiencies in its Ti-
tle V program by including all sources subject to sections 111
and 112 of the CAA within the applicability of the Virginia
operating permit requirements and permit fee provisions."2
After this correction, the EPA granted interim approval for
Virginia to administer its own state operating permit pro-
gram." Interim approval became effective July 10, 1997, and
will expire July 12, 1999.' During this time, permits issued
by the Commonwealth will be valid, and the Commonwealth
will be protected from EPA sanctions."5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in
United States v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., addressed the Na-
tional Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutant's
("NESHAP")1 7 definition of "use."" The court found a com-
pany liable for leaks of benzene that occurred after the EPA
provided the company with actual notice of its interpretation of
the regulations.'69 The controversy involved an exemption to
the emissions regulations for "[a]ny equipment in benzene ser-
vice that is located at a plant site designed to produce or use
less than 1000 megagrams of benzene per year."'70 Hoechst
Celanese Corp. ("1-CC") had construed the term "use" to mean
"consumption" and determined that its plant fit within the
160. See id. § 10.1-1318 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
161. Id.
162. See 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE 5-80-50 (1996 & Supp. 1998) (formerly VRR 120-08-
0501); 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE 5-80-310 (1996 & Supp. 1998) (formerly VRR 120-08-0601);
see also Clean Air Act Interim Approval of Operating Permit Program; Commonwealth
of Virginia, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,778, 12,780 (1997).
163. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 70 (1997).
164. See Technical Amendments To Clean Air Act Interim Approval of Operating
Permit Program; Commonwealth of Virginia, Correction of Effective Date Under Con-
gressional Review Act, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,346 (1998).
165. See Clean Air Act Final Interim Approval of Operating Permit Program; Com-
monwealth of Virginia, 62 Fed. Reg. 31,516, 31,518 (1997) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
70 app. A).
166. 128 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 1997).
167. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.01-.19, 61.110-.112, 61.240-.247 (1997).
168. See Hoechst Celanese, 128 F.3d at 219.
169. See id. at 230.
170. 40 C.F.R. § 61.110(cX2) (1997).
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exemption. 171 Therefore, HCC had never filed reports for the
plant or complied with any regulatory requirements. 2 The
Fourth Circuit determined that HCC's interpretation of "use"
was reasonable prior to 1989, when, based on the approval of
similar exemptions to HCC plants in other regions, HCC had
clarification that its interpretation of "use" was reasonable.'
However, HCC could not avail itself of a fair notice defense for
violations that occurred after 1989, when the EPA provided the
defendant with actual notice of the Agency's interpretation of
its benzene emissions regulations. 4
C. Virginia Legislative Developments
On December 11, 1997, in Kyoto, Japan, the parties to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 5
entered into the Kyoto Protocol 76 which calls for many indus-
trialized nations to cut greenhouse gas emissions 7 7 by six per-
cent to eight percent below 1990 levels.7 ' Among the sharpest
criticisms of the Kyoto Protocol is its failure to require develop-
ing countries to cut their emissions.'79 It seems unlikely that
the United States will ratify the Protocol, given that the resolu-
171. See Hoechst Celanese, 128 F.3d at 220.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 225.
174. See id. at 228-29.
175. Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849. Delegates included representatives from over 150 coun-
tries including: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Estonia, European Community, Finland France, Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian
Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States. See id.
176. Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M 22.
177. The six greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol include carbon diox-
ide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur hexafluoride, hydro fluorocarbons, and per fluoro-
carbons. See Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Annex A (visited July 14, 1998) <http'J/www.bigeye.com/kyoto.htm>.
178. Specific limits for key industrial powers include: European Union, eight
percent below 1990 levels; United States, seven percent below 1990 levels; and Japan,
six percent below 1990 levels. See id. at Annex B.
179. See Recent Developments in the Congress, [1998] 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,097, 10,098 (Feb. 1998).
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tion adopted in the Senate last summer to disapprove any pro-
tocol did not "mandate new specific scheduled commitments to
limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Coun-
try Parties within the same compliance period."18 The Virgin-
ia General Assembly took similar action on this front with
Senate Joint Resolution 58,"l' which followed the intent of
Congress to prevent ratification of the Kyoto Protocol until
developing countries commit to limiting such emissions.
Title H of the CAA requires states that contain certain ozone
and carbon monoxide (CO) nonattainment areas, 82 including
Virginia, revise their SIPs to incorporate Clean Fuel Fleet Pro-
grams." The Virginia Clean Fuel Fleet Program,' pursu-
ant to the federal guidelines," . specifies certain percentages of
new vehicles acquired by fleet operators that must be phased in
to the Clean Fuel Program starting in 1999." In 1998, the
Virginia General Assembly resolved to amend the Virginia pro-
gram by replacing the list of specific localities to which the
Clean Fuel Fleet Program applied with a generic description,
based on the CAA.'87 House Bill 682'" also authorized the
abolition of the entire Clean Fuel Fleet program if approved by
the EPA.
180. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
181. S.J. Res. 58, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998).
182. Nonattainment areas covered include the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area,
Atlanta, Chicago-Gary-Lake Counties, Milwaukee-Racine, Baton Rouge, and Denver-.
Boulder. See Clean Fuel Fleet Program, 63 Fed. Reg. 20,103, 20,104 (1998) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 88).
183. See id
184. See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1179.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 1998). "Clean Alternative
Fuel" includes methanol, ethanol, other alcohols, reformulated gasoline, diesel, natural
gases, liquified petroleum gas, hydrogen, and electricity or other power sources used
in clean fuel vehicles as required by the CAA. See id. A "fleet" consists of ten or
more centrally fueled vehicles owned or operated by a single entity. See id.
185. See 42 U.S.C. § 7586 (1994).
186. See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1179.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 1998).
187. The program will now apply to "localities designated by the federal Environ-
mental Protection Agency, pursuant to the federal Clean Air Act, as serious, severe,
or extreme air quality nonattainment areas, or as maintenance areas formerly desig-
nated serious, severe, or extreme." Id.
188. H.B. 682, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
46.2-1179.1 (Repl. Vol. 1998)).
1998] 1241
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1217
IV. SOLm AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
A. Federal Judicial Developments
Several recent Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA")5 9 decisions have ex-
panded on the principles of operator and arranger liability in
the Commonwealth of Virginia. On June 8, 1998, the Supreme
Court of the United States reached a significant decision re-
garding the imposition of operator liability' on corporate par-
ent companies participating in and exercising control over the
operations of a facility. Traditionally, corporate parent operator
liability focused on whether the corporate parent exercised
control over the business activities of its subsidiary. 9' In
United States v. Bestfoods,'9' the Supreme Court limited liabil-
ity for parent corporations to situations where "operation is evi-
denced by participation in the activities of the facility, not the
subsidiary."' Bestfoods also recognized the presumption that
corporate officers and directors of both a parent and subsidiary
may "change hats" to represent the two corporations
separately."9 Thus, the district court's imposition of liability
based on the actions of joint officers and directors, was improp-
er.'95 In the future, plaintiffs seeking to impose operator lia-
bility on a parent corporation will be forced to show that em-
ployees exclusive to the parent corporation exercised control
over the environmental management decisions at the subsidiary
facility. Otherwise, they will bear the burden of overcoming the
presumption that joint officers acted properly. 6
189. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
190. Responsible parties for purposes of CERCLA include "any person who at the
time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility." 42
U.S.C. § 9607(aX2) (1994).
191. See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990).
192. 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
193. Id. at 1887 (quoting Lynda J. Oswald, Bifurcation of the Owner and Operator
Analysis under CERCLA- Finding Order in Chaos of Pervasive Control, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 223, 269 (1994)).
194. See id at 1888.
195. See id. at 1889.
196. See Limited Liability for Corporations Affirmed as High Court Remands
Bestfoods' Case, [June] Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 110, at A-5 (June 9, 1998).
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
has addressed several important CERCLA issues including
arranger liability, potentially responsible party ('PRP") stand-
ing, and allocation. In United States v. North Landing Line
Construction Co.,"' the Fourth Circuit adopted the "crucial
decision" approach to the imposition of CERCLA arranger liabil-
ity.98 The court, in refusing to extend CERCLA liability to ev-
ery party in the chain of disposal, determined that the imposi-
tion of arranger liability requires actual knowledge of the dis-
posal of waste at a certain location.'" The court determined
that North Landing, which did not make the decision to send
PCB-laden transformers to the Superfund site, did not-make a
practical decision to deal with a specific and known responsible
party. Also, the court concluded that North Landing 'did not
have actual or constructive knowledge that the hazardous mate-
rials were to be sent to the Superfund site and failed to make
the required decision to dispose of the waste at a particular
site. Therefore, the company could not be subject to liability as
an arranger.
200
In Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton
Railroad Co.,201 the Fourth Circuit determined that a federal
district judge erred in imposing CERCLA liability upon five
railroads based on the disposal arrangement for wheel bearings
at a site contaminated by lead and other metals.2  The court
determined that to be a PRP2° under CERCLA, the party
must not only arrange for the treatment and disposal of a haz-
ardous substance, 2°' but the substance must also be a
waste.25 The court held that the contract between the rail-
roads and the foundry, for the shipment of used wheel bearings
197. 3 F. Supp. 2d 694 (E.D. Va. 1998).
198. See id. at 701.
199. See id at 702.
200. See i& at 701.
201. 142 F.3d 769 (4th Cir. 1998).
202. See i& at 776.
203. A potentially responsible party "refer[s] to a party who may be covered by the
statute at the time that said party is sued under the statute." See id. at 773 n.2.
Generally, past and present owners and operators, arrangers for disposal, and gen-
erators of the hazardous substance are covered persons under CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a) (1994).
204. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1994).
205. See Pneumo Abex Corp., 142 F.3d at 774.
1998] 1243
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW • [Vol. 32:1217
for subsequent processing into new bearings, was not a trans-
action for the disposal of hazardous waste sufficient to impose
CERCLA liability."' The Fourth Circuit's decision was based
on the intent of the parties to reuse the wheel bearings in their
entirety in the creation of new wheel bearings, noting that
'[t]he Foundry paid the appellants for the bearings; the appel-
lants did not pay the Foundry to dispose of unwanted met-
al."2o Therefore, because the railroads had not arranged for
the disposal of a waste, they incurred no liability under
CERCLA. Pneumo Abex Corp. is significant for its recognition
that recycling of materials containing hazardous substances
does not necessarily constitute the "treatment" or "disposal" of
hazardous substances.0 8
Pneumo Abex Corp. also marked the Fourth Circuit's adoption
of the position, consistently shared by other federal courts, that
a potentially responsible party must sue other potentially re-
sponsible parties only under section 113,09 CERCLA's contri-
bution provision.210
The Fourth Circuit also addressed the res judicata effect of
prior third party claims brought by a plaintiff against subse-
quent CERCLA cost recovery actions in Beazer East, Inc. v.
United States Navy.21' In Beazer, the court determined, in
finding that a subsequent section 107 of CERCLA action was
barred under principles of res judicata, that section 113(g)(2)
does not allow for multiple section 107 actions on liability, as
opposed to costs, at the same site. 12
The Fourth Circuit has reached several significant decisions
regarding Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA) 21' issues, including corrective action orders and citi-
206. See id. at 775.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 774.
209. Section 113 allows a court to exercise equitable discretion in apportioning
liability among responsible parties. Section 107, in contrast, contemplates the imposi-
tion of joint and several liability. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9603, 9607 (1994).
210. See Superfund: Fourth Circuit Joins Other Courts in Limiting Suits by Re-
sponsible Parties, [May] Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 85, at A-8 (May 4, 1998).
211. 111 F.3d 129 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision).
212. See Beazer East, Inc. v. Dep't of the Navy, [19971 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,308 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 1997).
213. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994).
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zen suit provisions. Cavallo v. Star Enterprise" was an im-
portant decision regarding the preemption of state law claims
based on liability arising under a federally mandated cleanup.
In that decision, the Fourth Circuit overturned a Virginia feder-
al judge's determination that a family's state law negligence
and trespass claims over a tank farm's release and cleanup of
petroleum products were federally preempted by RCRA. The
RCRA corrective action orders215 in place at the site encom-
passed only remediation efforts, and not all of Star Enterprise's
activities at the tank farm involved remediation."6 Further-
more, the court of appeals determined conduct mandated by an
EPA consenf order, but improperly performed, would not be
preempted by federal environmental law and could be a basis
for liability.2"7 Therefore, state law damages claims will" be
preempted by EPA orders only if (1) the tortious activities were
"required, directed, or supervised by the EPA, and (2) were
performed p-operly."218
In another decision addressing the effect of RCRA corrective
action orders, the Fourth Circuit in Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel
Corp. v. EPA 9 determined that an administrative order did
not violate provisions of a prior consent decree. The petitioner
asserted that the consent decree, which required disputes to be
resolved pursuant to the dispute resolution mechanisms of the
decree, barred the EPA from issuing a corrective action order at
the facility." In dismissing the plaintiffs petition for dispute
resolution, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the EPA's position that
the terms of the decree did not deprive the Agency of the au-
thority to issue additional orders at the site." In so doing,
the court noted that the EPA's interpretation of its own consent
decree would be judged under an arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard and "[e]ven if the EPA's interpretation is neither the only
214. 100 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1996).
215. RCRA § 7003 provides for judicial and administrative abatement of imminent
hazards. 42 U.S.C. § 6973. RCRA § 3008(h) governs corrective actions of releases at
interim status facilities, and RCRA § 3004(u) addresses corrective action for permitted
facilities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(h), 6924(u).
216. See Cavallo, 100 F.3d at 1156.
217. See id&
218. Id
219. No. 97-1756, 1997 WL 697100, at *1 (4th Cir. Nov. 10, 1997) (per curiam).
220. See id. at *1.
221. See id at *2.
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nor the best reading of the consent decree, it is certainly rea-
sonable enough so as not to be arbitrary and capricious."'
Finally, in Leister v. Black & Decker"m the Fourth Circuit
addressed RCRA citizen suit requirements.' It affirmed the
dismissal of a citizen suit alleging personal and property dam-
age from the presence of trichloroethylene ("TCE") and tetra-
chloroethylene ("PCE") emanating from Black & Decker proper-
ty." The court noted that RCRA's citizen suit provision "re-
quires more than a showing that the hazardous waste may
present an endangerment to health or the environment."'
Rather, the danger to health and the environment must be
"imminent" and "substantial.""2 Because the filtration systems
in the plaintiffs' wells eliminated the risk of contaminated
groundwater, the plaintiffs had failed to make such a show-
ing. 2
B. Virginia Legislative Developments
The interest in hauling solid waste 2' by barge has kindled
a controversy which found its way onto center stage of the 1998
Virginia General Assembly." ° Spurred in part by the desire to
222. Id.
223. No. 96-1751, 1997 WL 370846, at *1 (4th Cir. July 8, 1997).
224. Under RCRA's citizen suit provision, private parties may commence a civil
action "against any person.., who has contributed or who is contributing to the
past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid
or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to
health or the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1XB) (1994).
225. See Leister, 1997 WL 378046, at *4.
226. Id. at *2.
227. See id.
228. See id. at *1.
229. Solid waste is defined as:
any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply
treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded ma-
terial, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material re-
sulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations,
and from community activities, but does not include solid or dissolved
material in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved materials in irrigation
return flows or industrial discharges which are point sources subject to
permits . . . or source, special nuclear, or byproduct material as defined
by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1994).
230. See, e.g., H.B. 816, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (codified at VA. CODE
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-prohibit the interstate transport of solid waste into Virginia,
the 1998 General Assembly passed House Bill 816 23 and Sen-
ate Bill 6572 to regulate the transport of wastes on state wa-
ters. These bills require the Waste Management Board to devel-
op regulations governing (i) the transport, loading and unload-
ing of certain types of solid and medical wastes by ship, barge,
or other vessel upon navigable waters of the Commonwealth,
and (ii) the issuance of permits to facilities receiving such
wastes.' House Bill 818 and Senate Bill 656, which would
have prohibited the transport of solid and medical wastes by
ship, barge, or other vessel on state waters, were carried
over to the 1999 Session. These bills, which have brought td
the forefront the question of whether, and to what extent, Vir-
ginia will seek to impose restrictions on out-of-state waste, un -
doubtedly will continue to occupy the legislative agenda in the
future.
In further action addressing the out-of-state disposal of solid
waste in Virginia, the DEQ now is required to report annually
to the General Assembly the amounts of solid waste disposed in
Virginia.' The report must identify solid waste categorically,
and include both estimates of amounts of solid waste generated
ANN. § 10.1-1454.1 (Repl. Vol. 1998)); S.B. 657, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998)
(codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1454.1 (Repl. Vol. 1998)); H.B. 818, Va. Gen. As-
sembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (continued to 1999 Legislative Session); S.B. 656, Va. Gen.
Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (continued to 1999 Legislative Session); H.J. Res. 109, Va.
Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (memorializing Congress to pass legislation which
would provide states with the authority to regulate out-of-state waste); H.B. 1323, Va.
Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (rejecting legislation to create a solid waste contin-
gency fund and impose a tonnage fee on imported and exported waste).
231. H.B. 816 (enacted as Act of Apr. 16, 1998, ch. 717, 1998 Va. Acts 1706).
232. S.B. 657 (enacted as Act of Apr. 16, 1998, ch. 705, 1998 Va.'Acts 1636).
233. See id.; H.B. 816.
234. The prohibition would be only to the extent not inconsistent with the United
States Constitution. The ability of a state to decline out-of-state waste is limited by
the commerce clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court of the
United States has traditionally disfavored regulations imposing barriers to the inter-
state transport of waste. See City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); see
also Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994)
(holding that a surcharge on out-of-state waste is per se invalid under the commerce
clause); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources,
504 U.S. 353 (1992) (explaining that a state may not avoid invalidation under the
commerce clause by restricting inter-county waste as well as interstate waste); Chemi-
cal Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (holding that an additional
disposal fee for an out-of-state waste violates the commerce clause).
235. See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1413.1 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
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out-of-state and disposed of in Virginia, as well as estimates of
amounts of solid waste managed or disposed of by different
methods. To facilitate preparation of the report, permitted solid
waste facilities must provide the DEQ with any material infor-
mation in their possession." s
Specifically addressing solid waste recycling, the 1997 Gener-
al Assembly moved to require local and regional solid waste
planning units to maintain a twenty-five percent recycling
rate. 7 The Virginia Recycling Markets Development Council
also was instructed to determine the volume of various catego-
ries of materials currently recycled in the Commonwealth and
to submit its findings in its 1998 Annual Report.'
The General Assembly also moved to reduce notice and publi-
cation requirements for authorities who set fees or charges for
refuse collection. 9 Rather than requiring a schedule of fees or
charges to be published twice, with a public hearing held no
sooner than sixty days after the second publication, House Bill
1100 allows for a single publication with a hearing to be held
no sooner than fifteen days after publication.' The notice
and publication requirements for fees related to sewage disposal
and stormwater control facilities were not, however, altered by
House Bill 1100."4
House Bill 649242 empowers the Virginia Waste Manage-
ment Board to issue administrative orders called "special or-
ders" that have a duration of not more than twelve months and
contain a civil penalty of not more than $10,000.' Such or-
ders can only be issued for violations of: (i) any law or regula-
tion administered by the Board; (ii) any condition of a Board-
issued permit or certificate; or (iii) any case decision or order of
the Board. In any event, the orders can only be issued when a
236. See id.
237. See id. § 10.1-1411 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
238. See id. § 9-145.47 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
239. See H.B. 1100, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-5136 (Cum. Supp. 1998)).
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. H.B. 649, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
10.1-1455, -2500 (Repl. Vol. 1998)).
243. This power is slightly more restrictive than the similar power given to the
Air Pollution Control Board and the State Water Control Board. See id.
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hearing has been held, and at least two notices of violations
related to the same incident have not resulted in satisfactory
compliance.'
Finally, the General Assembly amended the definition of
household hazardous waste to include specific products which
contain hazardous chemicals or substances, such as certain
kinds of batteries, paint products, and empty household product
containers. 5
V. BROWNFIELDS
A. Federal Developments
The EPA established the Brownfields Action Agenda in
1995.' The initial program was intended to be a catalyst for
states to develop incentives and programs to expedite the clean-
up of properties that are under-utilized because of the presence
of contamination. However, it soon became apparent that state
incentives alone were not enough. The primary deterrent to
developing contaminated properties is the fear of liability felt
by prospective purchasers, the communities, and lenders. In an
effort to resolve these issues, the federal government has
passed guidance documents and legislation aimed at alleviating
the fear of federal prosecution. 7
244. See id
245. See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1400 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
246. The Brownfields Action Agenda, announced by the EPA on January 25, 1995,
outlined four elements for action: (1) awarding grant funds for Brownfields Assess-
ment Demonstration Pilots; (2) clarifying liability and cleanup issues; (3) fostering
partnership among brownfields stakeholders; and (4) encouraging local workforce de-
velopment job training initiatives. See U.S. EPA-OSPS Brownfields Homepage (last
modified Aug. 14, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/brownfields>. L
247. Prospective purchaser agreements have been offered by the EPA as one
means of alleviating the liability concerns of prospective purchasers. In some instanc-
es, the EPA will provide prospective purchasers of property that is listed or proposed
for listing on the National Priorities List, see 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1994), with a cove-
nant not to sue the purchaser if certain criteria are met. Those criteria include: (1)
"an EPA action at the facility has been taken, is ongoing, or is anticipated to be
undertaken;" (2) the EPA "receive[s] a substantial benefit either in the form of a
direct benefit for cleanup, or as an indirect public benefit ... with a reduced direct
benefit to the EPA," (3) "the continued operation of the facility or new site develop-
ment, with the exercise of due care, will not aggravate or contribute to the existing
contamination or interfere with the EPA's response action;" (4) "the continued opera-
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Comfort/Status Letters are used by EPA to alleviate concerns
of prospective purchasers.' If a purchaser requests such a
letter, EPA will provide one of the following four responses:
(1) No previous Federal Superfund Action letter-issued if
the site is not within the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Information System
("CERCLIS");
(2) No Current Federal Superfund Interest Letter-issued if
the site is no longer found in CERCLIS, has been delisted from
the National Priorities List, or is situated near, but not within,
the boundaries of a CERCLIS site;
(3) Federal Interest Letter-issued if the EPA plans to take
some action at the site, but has not yet determined the specific
type of action;
tion or new development of the property will not pose health risks to the community
and those persons likely to be present at the site;" and (5) "the prospective purchaser
is financially viable." Guidance on Settlements with Prospective Purchasers of Con-
taminated Property, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792, 34,792-95 (1995). These agreements also
provide contribution protection, which means that the purchaser may not be sued by
third parties forced to pay cleanup costs due to contamination at the site. See id.
The EPA developed its Contaminated Aquifer Policy to protect purchasers of
property that may have been contaminated by neighboring property. The EPA will
exercise enforcement discretion by not taking action against a property owner when
(i) hazardous substances have come to the property solely through the result of
groundwater migration, and (ii) the landowner did not cause or contribute to the
release or threat of release of any hazardous substance. Under this policy, the EPA
will analyze the relationship between the landowners and the person who contaminat-
ed the aquifer. The EPA also will perform a fact specific analysis of the effect that
groundwater wells on the landowner's property may have had on the spread of con-
tamination. See Policy Toward Owners of Property Containing Contaminated Aquifers,
60 Fed. Reg. 34,790, 34,790 (1995).
Congress recently enacted legislation attempting to alleviate lender liability con-
cerns. The legislation provided statutory authority to the EPA's 1992 policy, clarifying
that a lender is exempt from CERCLA liability only if it "holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect a security interest" without participating in management of the
facility. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(EXi) (Supp. 11 1996). This applies to all types of lenders
and security arrangements, not just traditional commercial lenders and mortgages. In
order to be protected, the lender must divest the property at the earliest reasonable
time on commercially reasonable terms. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20XE)(iiXl); see also
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan: Lender Liability
Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,344-62 (1992).
248. See Policy on the Issuance of Comfort/Status Letters, 62 Fed. Reg. 4624, 4624
(1997).
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(4) State Action Letter-issued when a state has the lead
oversight for a response action. 9
To support state voluntary cleanup programs, the EPA has
entered into memoranda of agreement ("MOA") with some
states agreeing not to bring any action against a site if the site
has received a "no further requirements" letter or certificate of
completion/satisfaction from the state agency.' The EPA may
still bring an action if it determines that (i) there is an "immi-
nent and substantial endangerment to public health or welfare
or the environment;"2 ' (ii) there is previously undiscovered or
new contamination found at the site; (iii) new information of a
material nature is learned about the site; or (iv) the "no further
requirements" lettef or "certificate of completion" was obtained
fraudulently. 2
Most recently, the Taxpayer Relief Act' was signed into
law on August 5, 1997, allowing taxpayers to elect to treat cer-
tain environmental remediation expenditures as expenses de-
ductible in the year paid or incurred, rather than being capital-
ized. Expenditures must be incurred in connection with the
abatement or control of hazardous substances at a qualified
contaminated site.' These incentives are only available in
certain target areas, such as empowerment zones, enterprise
communities, or the EPA Brownfields pilot project locations.'
The Act has a sunset provision providing that the incentive is
only available for expenses incurred between August 6, 1997,
and January 1, 2001."
The EPA is in the process of awarding Brownfields Cleanup
Revolving Loan Fund Demonstration Pilots 5' to state and lo-
249. See id. at 4625-26.
250. See Notice of Availability of Final Draft Guidance for Developing Superfund
Memoranda of Agreement Language Concerning State Voluntary Cleanup Programs,
62 Fed. Reg. 47,495, 47,500 (1997).
251. Id. at 47,498.
252. See id.
253. See 26 U.S.C-A § 198(a) (Supp. 1998).
254. See id. § 198(bXl).
255. See id. § 198(cX2)(A).
256. See id. § 198(h).
257. See The Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative, Proposal Guidelines
for Brownfields Cleanup Revolving Loan Fund Demonstration Pilots (last modified
Apr. 30, 1997) <http//www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/html-doc/rlfguide.htm>.
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cal governments. Only entities that had been awarded national
or regional Brownfields assessment pilots are eligible for revolv-
ing loan fundsY8 In order to be selected, eligible communities
must demonstrate (1) an ability to manage a revolving loan
fund and environmental cleanups; (2) a need for cleanup
funds; (3) commitment to creative leveraging of EPA funds
with public-private partnerships and in-kind services; and
(4) a clear plan for sustaining the environmental protection
and related economic development activities initiated
through the ... program. 9
The size of the awards will range from $50,000 to $350,000.
The fund must be used to provide low-interest loans to public
and private parties for the cleanup of brownfields sites that
have already been assessed for contamination.2"
B. Virginia Developments
Virginia has also made efforts to encourage the remediation
of brownfields sites. In 1995, the General Assembly passed, the
Voluntary Remediation Program ("VRP). 6  Regulations gov-
erning the program became effective in June 19972 and are
administered by the DEQ's Waste Management Board. The pro-
gram offers expedited permitting, relaxed cleanup standards,
and a certificate of satisfactory completion2" at the conclusion
of the cleanup. Such incentives are aimed at encouraging own-
ers of brownfields property to voluntarily bring their property
back to useful life.2
258. See id.
259. Id.
260. See id.
261. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1429.1 to -1429.3 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
262. See 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE-20-160-10 to -130 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
263. The certificate of satisfactory completion is issued by the DEQ once the site
has been cleaned up in accordance with an approved remedial action plan. The certif-
icate guarantees immunity from enforcement actions brought under the Virginia
Waste Management Act, Virginia State Water Control Law, Virginia Air Pollution
Control Board, or other applicable Virginia law. The regulations provide that the
certificate would be revocable at any time if contamination posing a risk to human
health and the environment is rediscovered on site or found to have migrated off-site,
or if information on certification was false, inaccurate, or misleading. See id. at 20-
160-110.
264. The VRP is open to any person who owns, operates, has a security interest
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In 1997, the Commonwealth established the Remediated
Property Fresh Start Program,2" which provides a limit on
the liability for prospective purchasers of property cleaned up
under CERCLA, so long as it has been remediated to the satis-
faction of the EPA Administrator. Additionally, Virginia passed
legislation in 1997 providing authority to local governments to
implement tax incentives for "environmental restoration
sites,"2" defined to include voluntary remediation program
sites.6 7 The governing body of any county, city, or town may,
by ordinance, exempt or partially exempt such property from
local taxation annually for a period not in excess of five
years."
In 1998, the Virginia General Assembly passed legislation
requesting a study on the possibility of implementing "smart
growth"" measures in Virginia. 70  The Commission on the
Condition and Future of Virginia's Cities also was created to
study legislative measures to help cities achieve economic
in, or enters into, a contract for the purchase or use of contaminated property and
who wishes to voluntarily remediate the property. See id. at 20-160-30(B) (Cum.
Supp. 1998). Sites contaminated with hazardous waste, solid waste, or petroleum are
eligible so long as the cleanup is not "clearly mandated" by any state or federal envi-
ronmental law. See id. at 20-160-30(C) (Cum. Supp. 1998). Once enrolled in the pro-
gram, standards for remediation would be flexible. The cleanup standards are based
on a risk assessment of the site reflecting the current and future uses of the site.
Cleanup standards would be more stringent if the site was intended for residential or
educational use; however, if the site would remain classified for industrial use, the
standards would be less stringent. See id. at 20-160-90(B) (Cum. Supp. 1998). The
program does provide that the site could not be used in a capacity where the same
contaminants would be used. See iU at 20-160-30, -90.
265. See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1429.4 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
266. An environmental restoration site is real estate which contains or did contain
environmental contamination from the release of hazardous substances; hazardous
wastes, solid waste, or petroleum. The restoration of such a site would abate or pre- r
vent pollution to the atmosphere or waters of the Commonwealth and is subject- to
voluntary remediation. Upon restoration, the site receives a certificate of continued
eligibility from the Virginia Waste Management Board during each year which it
qualifies for the tax treatment described in this section. See id. § 58.1-3664 (Repl.
Vol. 1998).
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. Maryland enacted "smart growth" legislation in 1997.. Smart growth measures
target state funding for infrastructure to those areas designated for growth. See MD.
CODE ANN. STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 5-7B-01 to 5-7B-10 (1995 & Supp. 1997).
270. See S.J. Res. 177, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998).
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stability.271' Growth management will become a key issue giv-
en its impact on all environmental media.
VI. WETLANDS
Recent wetlands case law has led to significant changes in
regulation governing the issuance of section 404 permits.272
First, in early 1997, the federal district court of the District of
Columbia rejected the Army Corps of Engineer's ("Corps")
"Tulloch Rule."2" The rule, which required a section 404 per-
mit for incidental fallback that generally coincides with dredg-
ing activities, was determined by the court to be overbroad and
to exceed the scope of the Corps' authority to regulate additions
of materials to wetlands. The court found that incidental
fallback "represents a net withdrawal, not an addition of mate-
rial" and cannot be regulated as a discharge by the Corps. 4
In an even bolder decision, the Fourth Circuit rejected the
Corps' definition of "waters of the United States."275 In United
States v. Wilson, defendants were convicted of felony violations
of the Clean Water Act for knowingly discharging fill and exca-
vated material into wetlands without a permit.2 7' The defen-
dants appealed their convictions on the ground that the Corps'
regulations governing wetland permits exceeded the Corps'
regulatory authority. The regulatory definition developed by the
Corps defines waters of the United States to include all waters
271. See H.J. Res. 432, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998).
272. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1344 (1994).
273. The Tulloch Rule changed the preexisting framework which provided a de
minimis exception from the definition of the "discharge of dredged material" requiring
a permit. Under the Tulloch Rule, any addition of dredged material, including exca-
vated material, is deemed the discharge of dredged material and requires a permit.
The rule has been interpreted to include "incidental" fall back, which includes soils or
sediments falling from the bucket back into the water. See American Mining Congress
v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 951 F. Supp. 267 (D.D.C. 1997), affd sub
nom. National Mining Ass'n v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399
(D.C. Cir. 1998). The court enjoined the Corps from using the rule. See id. at 1410.
274. Id. at 1404.
275. See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1997). The Corps'
petition for rehearing was denied on January 26, 1998. See Guidance for Corps and
EPA Field Offices Regarding Clean Water Act Section 404 Jurisdiction Over Isolated
Waters in Light of United States v. James J. Wilson (last modified June 2, 1998)
<http-//wnn.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/wilson.htm> [hereinafter Guidance for Section 4041.
276. See Wilson, 133 F.3d. at 253.
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whose degradation "could affect" interstate commerce."' The
court concluded this definition was overly broad and exceeded
the authority granted to the Corps by the Clean Water Act.
Moreover, the court indicated the regulation likely violated the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 8
The court also determined that "sidecasting," or moving
dredged material from one area in a wetland to another during
the construction of drainage ditches, does not violate the Clean
Water Act.7 9 The court reasoned that because "sidecasted" soil
is not equivalent to the addition of a new material, it is not a
"discharge" under the Clean Water Act definition of dis-
charge.
Finally, the court found that the Clean Water Act requires
the government to prove a defendant's knowledge of facts meet-
ing each essential element of the substantive offense. 1 How-
ever, the government is not required to prove that the defen-
dant knew his conduct was illegal. 2
Since the Wilson decision, the EPA has issued written guid-
ance regarding section 404 jurisdiction over isolated waters.'
The guidance makes clear that the Corps will only apply the
Wilson decision within the Fourth Circuit and will continue to
litigate this issue in other courts. For now, the Corps and EPA
will not cite 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) as a basis for, asserting
Clean Water Act jurisdiction within the Fourth Circuit. Permits
277. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1998).
278. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 257.
279. See id. at 260.
280. See id. at 259-60.
281. See id. at 262. In other words, the government must prove the following facts
in order to establish a felony violation under the Clean Water Act:
(1) that the defendant knew that he was discharging a substance . . .
(2) that the defendant correctly identified the substance he was discharg-
ing... ; (3) that the defendant knew the method or instrumentality
used to discharge the pollutants; (4) that the defendant knew the physi-
cal characteristics of the property into which the pollutant was dis-
charged that identify it as a wetland ... ; (5) that the defendant was
aware of the facts establishing the required link between the wetland
and waters of the United States; and (6) that the defendant knew he did
not have a permit.
Id. at 264.
282. See id. at 262.
283. See Guidance for Section 404, supra note 275.
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issued to isolated waters on the basis of 33 C.F.R. § 328(a)(3)
will remain in effect.' Environmentalists are upset about the
decision because it significantly reduces the number of wetlands
under federal regulation and sets a precedent for using the
Commerce Clause to rollback other federal protection laws.'
Several cases of note occurred outside of the Fourth Circuit.
Most recently, a United States district court in Mango v. Unit-
ed States 6 ruled that district engineers of the Corps do not
have the statutory authority to issue section 404 permits for
the discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters
of the United States. 7
The case involved the criminal prosecution of several defen-
dants for alleged violation of a section 404 permit issued by a
Buffalo District Engineer. The Clean Water Act authorizes the
Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers,
to issue section 404 permits.' The Act, however, neither au-
thorizes, nor proscribes further delegation of this permitting au-
thority by the Secretary of the Army to its district engineers.
The defendants argued that because the Clean Water Act only
punishes violations of permits issued by the Secretary of the
Army, defendants could not be prosecuted for violation of a
permit issued by a district engineer."s
The court applied the traditional test of agency authority set
forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.29 Based upon this plain language- review, the
court found that "the language of section 404 unambiguously
demonstrates that Congress intended to limit the Secretary's
delegation authority to the Chief of Engineers."29' The court
explained that the absence of an express proscription against
subdelegation by the Secretary "does not provide the court with
284. See id.
285. The Commerce Clause is beginning to impact environmental regulation in a
number of areas. See, e.g., interstate waste discussion, supra note 234.
286. 997 F. Supp. 264 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
287. See id.
288. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(d) (1994).
289. See Mango, 997 F. Supp. at 269.
290. 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (holding that agencies must give effect to the clear
intent of Congress).
291. Mango, 997 F. Supp. at 277.
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a license to ignore the proscription necessarily implied by the
explicit limiting language of section 404." 2
While it is difficult to predict whether the court's reasoning
in Mango will be followed by other courts, or even upheld on
appeal, the decision clearly calls into question the validity and
enforceability of section 404 permits issued by district engi-
neers. Additionally, permit conditions, which are not directly re-
lated to the discharge of dredged or fill material into regulated
waters, also remain subject to ongoing scrutiny.
In United States v. Rapanos,"3 the Sixth Circuit found that
wetland property owned by the defendant was not protected by
the Fourth Amendment. In this case, the defendant .refused to
allow Michigan Department of Natural Resources officials onto
his property to make a visual wetlands determination without a
search warrant. The court found that the property was not
protected by the Fourth Amendment because the property met
the "open fields" exception.' The property consisted of 175
open acres, surrounded on two sides by a highway. Accordingly,
the court found that the defendant did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the property. 5 A visual inspection
made during a warrantless entry onto open fields does not
constitute an unreasonable search for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses. 6
The Eleventh Circuit recently held that the five-year statute
of limitations for civil penalties does not bar or apply to a suit
for injunctive relief and restoration against an alleged violator
of CWA requirements for wetlands protection."7 Accordingly,
equitable relief, including wetlands restoration, may be obtained
long after legal remedies are precluded." S
On the regulatory side, the Corps has announced that "six
new nationwide permits authorizing categories of activities with
292. Id.
293. 115 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 1997).
294. See id. at 372-73 (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) and
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984)).
295. See id. at 373.
296. See id. at 374.
297. See United States v. Banks, 115 F.3d 916, 922 (11th Cir. 1997).
298. See id. at 922.
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minimal impacts on wetlands [will] be issued and six existing
permits [will] be modified."' The proposal, "which authorizes
development with minimal impacts on wetlands of one-third of
an acre to three acres in size," would replace Nationwide Per-
mit 26 and is expected by the end of 1998. o
The new proposed permits would apply to the following activ-
ities:
(1) residential, commercial, and institutional activities af-
fecting non-tidal water between one-third and three acres;
(2) 'master-planned development activities affecting up to
ten acres of non-tidal waters; (3) stormwater management
facilities involving construction on up to two acres in so-
called non-Section 10 waters, described in the Rivers and
Harbors Act as those navigable by boat, with no acreage
limit for maintenance; (4) passive recreational facilities that
would disturb between one-third and one acre of non-tidal
waters o 500 linear feet of stream; (5) mining activities on
up to three acres of non-tidal waters; and (6) reconfigura-
tion of existing drainage ditches restricted to the minimum
necessary of non-Section 10 waters. Preconstruction notifi-
cation would be required if any sidecasting is involved."0 1
There also have been several changes to wetlands regulations
on the state level. House Bill 2414 requires the Virginia Marine
Resources Commission to develop a procedure to expedite the
issuance of wetlands permits in emergency situations."° A
new tax break has been created for wetlands and riparian buff-
ers. Local- governments may exempt or partially exempt from
local property tax, wetlands and riparian buffers that are sub-
ject to perpetual easement by water allowing flooding.3"
299. Wetlands: Six New Classes Covered at Activities Under Proposed Corps Re-
placement Permits, [June] Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 122, at AA-1 (June 25, 1998).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1 (Repl. Vol. 1998); id. § 28.2-1307 (Repl. Vol.
1997).
303. See id. §§ 58.1-3230, -3665, -3666 (Repl. Vol. 1997 & Cum. Supp. 1998).
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VII. OIL POLLUTION
Legislation was passed to include a gas owner or operator or
storage field operator among those that are heard de novo by
the Virginia Gas and Oil Board.3" Additionally, appeals of
permits which were objected to by gas storage field operators
will now stay the permit in certain circumstances.0 5 The con-
sent required as part of the permit application for coal bed
methane gas wells may now be considered granted on sites
owned by multiple tenants, where co-tenants holding the major-
ity interest in the site consent, and none of the tenants has
leased the tract for coal development."0 6 Finally, a well-spac-
ing requirement was added for gas storage fields certificated by
the State Corporation Commission prior to January 1, 1997.07
Gas storage field operators must be given notice of hearing ap-
plications involving the field operator's certificated area."
Legislation also was passed creating a right to a contribution
action by an owner or operator that incurs costs in responding
to a discharge that was caused by a third party.3" Similarly,
any person or operator who pays costs or damages to the Com-
monwealth or a third party for harm caused by a discharge, or
threat of discharge, may bring a cost recovery action against
the person whose acts or omissions have caused or contributed
to the discharge or threat.1 0
The State Water Control Board now is able to require a per-
son causing a discharge of oil to take any steps "deemed neces-
sary in the judgment of the Board" to affect a cleanup."'
Such steps may be in addition to, or in lieu of, those that may
be found in the person's oil spill contingency plan.31
304. See id. § 45.1-361.9 (Repl. Vol. 1998). Legislation governing oil, gas, or coal
operations is administered by the Virginia Gas and Oil Board and the Department of
Mines, Minerals, and Energy.
305. See id. § 45.1-361.23 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
306. See id. § 45.1-361.29 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
307. See id. §§ 45.1-361.19, -361.30 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
308. See i&L
309. See id. § 62.1-44.34:18 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
310. See id.
311. Id.
312. See id.
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The provisions governing the obligations of the DEQ and the
Department of Health ("DOH"), in response to an oil spill, have
been modified. The DEQ must compile a list of the locations of
oil releases, which are serious enough to have a site character-
ization analysis performed, and must submit the list to the
DOH on a monthly basis."' A person who has a well located
in an area affected by an oil release may request the DOH to
test that well's water for oil contamination. If the test indicates
that the water supply is a potential risk to public health, the
state will assume the costs of the test. " The DOH also must
also maintain a list of private laboratories that perform well
water tests for public use. Residential property disclosure state-
ments must contain a notice to prospective purchasers and
owners that the DEQ maintains information which identifies
the location of oil releases that may affect the property."1 5
Recent case law has held that "muck""6 is not covered by
the oil residue discharge rules found in the Act to Prevent
Pollution by Ships.1 In United States v. Apex Oil Co., defen-
dants were accused of conspiring to discharge cargo-related oil
residues at sea.18 The federal court of appeals, relying on
Cose v. Getty Oil Co.,19 held that "muck" is not refined petro-
leum or a useful petroleum product.32 Accordingly, "muck"
should be treated as a discarded waste, not an oil residue.
Other case law of interest has provided that the Oil Pollution
Act ("OPA7)32' allows a trustee (appointed by either the Presi-
dent, a governor, the governing body of an Indian tribe, or the
head of a foreign government) to recover for damages to natural
313. See id. § 32.1-176.5:1 (Repl. Vol. 1997 & Cum. Supp. 1998) (effective Jan. 1,
1999); id. § 62.1-44.15:4.1 (Repl. Vol. 1998); see also id. § 55-519 (Repl. Vol. 1995 &
Cum. Supp. 1998) (effective Jan. 1, 1999).
314. See id. § 32.1-176.5:1 (Repl. Vol. 1997 & Cum. Supp. 1998) (effective Jan. 1,
1999).
315. See id. § 55-519 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1998) (effective Jan. 1, 1999);
id. § 32.1-176.5:1 (Repl. Vol. 1997 & Cum. Supp. 1998).
316. "Muck" is the residue remaining after oil is cleaned out of a ship's hold. See
United States v. Apex Oil Co., 132 F.3d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1997).
317. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1915 (1994); see also 33 C.F.R. pt. 151 (1997).
318. See Apex Oil, 132 F.3d at 1288.
319. 4 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the bottoms of crude oil tanks were
discarded waste and not petroleum products).
320. See Apex Oil, 132 F.3d at 1291.
321. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994).
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resources due to an oil spill in navigable waters or adjoining
shorelines." The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration ("NOAA") was tasked with promulgating regulations for
the assessment of natural resource damages.3" The final rules
authorize the recovery of non-use or "passive" losses."s To de-
termine a non-use value, a survey technique known as "contin-
gent valuation" is used. Under this technique, a hypothetical
market is created and citizens are asked to respond to a survey
about how much they would pay to protect a given resource.
Responses are averaged to determine the value citizens place on
the resource." The court held that this technique was autho-
rized by the OPA.3" The court, however, did remand the por-
tion of the rule regarding the trustee's removal authority,
claiming that the NOAA did not adequately explain the differ-
ence between the authority granted in the final regulation and
the proposed rule.327 The court also found that the NOAA
failed to explain the interrelationship of the trustee's residual
removal authority and the primary authority of EPA and the
Coast Guard."
VIII. UNDERGROUND AND ABOVE GROUND STORAGE TANKS
The Virginia Underground Storage Tank ("UST") Program'
has undergone several recent changes designed.to secure final
program approval from the EPA. The most significant modifica-
tion to the program was introduced by House Bill 615,"o
322. See General Elec. Co. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767; 770
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
323. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 990.10-.60 (1998).
324. "Passive" losses are determined by the value citizens place on the mere exis-
tence of natural resources. See General Elec., 128 F.3d at 772.
325. See id.
326. See id. at 778.
327. See id. at 775.
328. See id. at 774-75.
329. The DEQ administers the UST program in accordance with the State Water
Control Law, the Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Financial Responsibility Re-
quirements Regulation, and the Underground Storage Tank Technical Standards and
Corrective Action Requirements Regulation. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.34:8 to :13
(Repl. Vol. 1998); 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE 25-580-10 to -590-230 (1996 & Cum. Supp.
1998) (formerly VRR 680-13-02 to -03).
330. H.B. 615, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
62.1-44.34:11 to :13 (Repl. Vol. 1998)).
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which incorporated the federal UST statutory provisions, relat-
ing to demonstration of financial responsibility"' into the Vir-
ginia Financial Responsibility Regulation. 32  Specifically,
House Bill 615 incorporated federal provisions which require an
owner or operator to maintain financial resources of at least
$1,000,000' for each occurrence." To satisfy the financial
responsibility requirement, an owner or operator may use any
one or more of the following assurance mechanisms: "insurance,
guarantee, surety bond, letter of credit, [or] qualification as a
self-insurer." 5 These amendments are not expected to add
any additional monetary or administrative burden on Virginia
UST owners and operators, as the DEQ traditionally required
UST owners and operators to use the Virginia sliding scale 6
in conjunction with the Virginia Petroleum Storage 'Tank
Fund3 7 to demonstrate the federally required amounts."
House Bill 615 also requires any person or state agency seek-
ing reimbursement from the fund for costs and expenses in-
curred for oil cleanup to have acted at the direction of the State
Water Control Board in undertaking the cleanup.3" The bill
further limits eligibility for reimbursement to those who file a
331. See 40 C.F.R. § 281.37 (1998).
332. 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE 25-590-10 to -590-230 (1996 & Cum. Supp. 1998) (former-
ly VRR 680-13-02).
333. Owners and operators of 1 to 99 petroleum USTs must demonstrate financial
responsibility for up to $1 million in corrective action and third parties injury cbsts.
Owners and operators with 100 or more USTs must demonstrate that they are able
to pay an annual aggregate of $2 million. See 40 C.F.R. § 281.37(a)(1)-(4) (1998); 9
VA. ADMIN. CODE 25-590-40(A) (1996 and as amended by 14:23 Va.R. 3607 (1998))
(formerly VRR 680-13-03 § 4).
334. The EPA defines "occurrence" as "an accident, including continuous or repeat-
ed exposure to conditions, which results in a release from an underground storage
tank." 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(d)(5)(A) (1994).
335. 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(dX1) (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:12(A) (Repl. Vol
1998).
336. See 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE 25-590-40(A) (1996 and as amended by 14:23 Va.R.
3607 (1998)) (formerly VRR 680-13-03 § 4).
337. The Virginia Petroleum Storage Tank Fund is a revolving fund established to
reimburse owners and operators for certain qualifying tank cleanup costs. See VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.34:8, :10, :11 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
338. Memorandum from Mary-Ellen Kendall, Financial Programs Manager, Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality, Underground Storage Tank Program Regulatory Up-
date (on file with author).
339. See VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:11(A)(2)(k) (Repl. Vol. 1998).
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claim by July 1, 2000, or within two years of the issuance of a
site remediation letter by the Board, whichever is later."
In the courts, a North Carolina federal district court recently
held that nuisance and trespass claims may be brought for
continuing migration of contamination, even though the current
property owners were not responsible for the USTs. 1 The
court concluded that once UST owners became aware of the
contamination, they became responsible for any continued mi-
gration of the contamination. 2
IX. MISCELLANEOUS ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
A. Citizen Standing
Recently, the Supreme Court squarely addressed citizen suit
requirements under both the Endangered Species Act
("ESA")' and the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act ("EPCRA"). 3 ' In Bennett v. Spear,"5 the
United States Supreme Court expanded citizen standing under
the ESA.3" The Court determined the traditional 'zone of
interest' test"r has been negated by the ESA citizen suit pro-
vision." The Supreme Court relied on the ESA *citizen suit
provision which allows "any person" to file suit. Such a provi-
sion, the Court held, is sufficiently broad to allow a plaintiff
asserting any interest, whether economic or environmental, 9
to establish standing so long as a demonstrable injury is pres-
ent.350
340. See id. § 62.1-44.34:11(A)(10) (Repl. Vol. 1998).
341. See Rudd v. Electrolux Corp., 982 F. Supp. 355, 370-71 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
342. See id.
343.. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
344. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,001-11,050 (1994).
345. 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
346. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g).
347. The zone of interest test requires that a plaintiff possess an injury falling
"within the 'zone of interest' sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose
violation forms the legal basis for [the] complaint." Spear, 117 S. Ct. at 1167; see also
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
348. See Spear, 117 S. Ct. at 1162.
349. Traditionally, courts have limited standing only to those plaintiffs seeking to
protect endangered species under the ESA. See Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915 (9th
Cir. 1995).
350. See Spear, 117 S. Ct. at 1159; Ann E. Carlson, Standing for the Environment,
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In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,35' the
United States Supreme Court determined that citizen suits may
not be brought for wholly past violations of EPCRA if the viola-
tions are filly addressed before the suit is filed.352 The
EPCRA establishes a reporting scheme whereby users of toxic
chemicals must inventory the toxic chemicals used by their
facilities annually" and report any releases of these invento-
ried chemicals into the environment." EPCRA's citizen suit
provision provides that a citizen may sue in federal district
court after giving sixty-days notice to the violator, the EPA, and
state authorities. 55 The Supreme Court of the United States,
relying on the absence of a remedy to redress the citizen's
claims, 55 determined that the structure of the EPCRA's citi-
zen suit provision precludes penalties for purely historical viola-
tions of the Act.5 ' In effect, the decision will limit justicia-
bility to suits with ongoing violations, allowing nonreporting
companies to evade liability by delaying compliance until a
citizen notice letter is received, but before the citizen files
suit." Steel underscores the ever-increasing emphasis on com-
munity right-to-know issues by creating a significant burden on
citizen enforcement of EPCRA.
45 UCLA L. REv. 931, 951 (1998).
351. 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998).
352. See id. at 1020.
353. See 42 U.S.C. § 11,022(a) (1994).
354. See id. The EPCRA inventory and reporting requirements of sections 312 and
313 of the Act are triggered when a listed toxic chemical is manufactured, processed,
or otherwise used in quantities exceeding a threshold quantity established in section
313. See id. § 11,023(a), (c).
355. See id. § 11,046(d).
356. The request for declaratory judgment was worthless because the past EPCRA
violations were uncontroverted. Civil penalties payable to the United States Treasury
would not redress the group. The costs of litigation could not alone support standing.
And the requested injunctive relief was aimed at deterring future EPCRA violations,
but the group only alleged past violations. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1018-19.
357. See id.
358. See Jim Hecker, EPCRA Citizen Suits After Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, [1998 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,306 (June 1998).
1264
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
B. Supplemental Environmental Projects
The DEQ now is officially authorized to undertake supple-
mental environmental projects through consent orders. 59 A
supplemental environmental project ("SEP") is an environmen-
tally beneficial project undertaken as a partial settlement of a
civil enforcement action that is not otherwise required by law.
The project must have a reasonable geographic nexus to the
violation or, if no such project is available, must advance objec-
tives of the law or regulation violated. The project must be
accepted by the person subject to the order and is enforceable
just as any other provision of the order. Approval of the SEP is
within the sole discretion of the responsible board, official, or
court, and is not subject to appeal. The DEQ has developed a
policy to govern the agency's use of SEPs.3"
The EPA has issued a new policy on! the use of SEPs, effec-
tive May 1, 1998, similar in most respects to the 1995 interim
policy.3"' Changes include new provisions encouraging commu-
nity input into the SEP selection process, provisions prohibiting
the use of SEPs to mitigate claims for stipulated penalties, and
revised penalty calculation provisions. The legal guidelines
governing the use of SEPs were also revised.36
C. Small Business Environmental Compliance Assistance Fund
Legislation was passed by the General Assembly in 1997,
creating the Small Business Environmental Compliance Assis-
tance Fund.3" The fund provides loans to small businesses for
the purchase and installation of environmental pollution control
and prevention equipment. The DEQ administers this fund,
359. See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1186.2 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
360. See Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEP) (last modified July 13,
1998) <http//www.deq.state.-va.us/currentsep.html>.
361. See Issuance of Final Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy, [Apr.] Daily
En't Rep. (BNA) No. 83, at E-3 to E-12 (Apr. 10, 1998).
362. See id.
363. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-6.14:4.1, 10.1-2500, 10.1-2502, 10.1-1197.1 to .4 (Repl.
Vol. 1998).
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determines which small businesses receive loans, and the terms
and conditions of the loans.36
D. Environmental Mediation
Alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") is increasingly seen as
a less costly alternative to litigation. In 1997, the General As-
sembly granted the State Air Pollution Control Board, the State
Water Control Board, and the Virginia Waste Management
Board discretionary authority to employ mediation or a dispute
resolution proceeding. This authority is limited to use "in appro-
priate cases to resolve underlying issues, reach consensus or
compromise on contested issues."3  Each Board is to adopt its
own rules and regulations to implement the utilization of
nonbinding mediation and dispute resolution proceedings.3"
The statute is clear that alternative dispute resolution is not
recommended if:
(1) [a] definitive or authoritative resolution of the matter is
required for precedential value, and such a proceeding is
not likely to be accepted generally as an authoritative pre-
cedent; (2) [t]he matter involves or may bear upon signifi-
cant questions of state policy that require additional proce-
dures before a final resolution may be made, and such a
proceeding would not likely serve to develop a recommended
policy for the Board; (3) [m]aintaining established policies is
of special importance, so that variations among individual
decisions are not increased and such a proceeding would not
likely reach consistent results among individual decisions;
(4) [t]he matter significantly affects persons or organizations
who are not parties to the proceedings; (5) [a] full public
record of the proceeding is important, and a mediation or
dispute resolution proceeding cannot provide such a record;
and (6) [t]he Board must maintain continuing jurisdiction
over the matter with the authority to alter the disposition
of the matter in light of changed circumstances, and a me-
diation or dispute resolution proceeding would interfere
with the Board's fulfilling that requirement.367
364. See id. § 10.1-1197.1 to .4 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
365. Id. § 10.1-1186.3(A) (Repl. Vol. 1998).
366. See id. § 10.1-1186.3(D) (Repl. Vol. 1998).
367. Id. § 10.1-1186.3(A) (Repl. Vol. 1998).
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E. Prosecution of Environmental Offenses
The General Assembly authorized the Attorney General to
prosecute violations of state air, waste, and water laws.3 6' The
Attorney General may only take such action if the local
Commonwealth's Attorney concurs.
F. Environmental Impact Reports
The 1997 General Assembly expanded the scope of environ-
mental impact reports. The reports must include a project's
impact on wildlife habitat.3"
K EXPECTATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
A. Environmental Justice
A recent flurry of controversy370 at both the state and feder-
al level, regarding the issue of environmental justice, will un-
doubtedly have wide ranging implications throughout the Com-
monwealth in coming years. At the direction of President
Clinton's Executive Order 12898,87' the EPA and its regional
offices have begun to include environmental justice as a consid-
eration in the review of federally delegated state permit pro-
grams and in prioritizing enforcement.
In addition, pursuant to recent EPA environmental justice
guidelines, state agencies, such as the DEQ, must comply with
368. See id. § 2.1-124 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
369. See id. § 10.1-1188 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
370. Several recent cases that have challenged agency issuance of permits to facili-
ties located in minority communities have received widespread attention in recent
months. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 944 F. Supp. 413
(E.D. Pa. 1996), rev'd in part and remanded, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding
that individuals could bring suit under federal civil rights laws challenging the dis-
criminatory effect of Agency permit issuance); see also NAACP-Flint Chapter v. Michi-
gan Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 564 N.W.2d 38 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
371. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. § 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1994).
372. See Taking Environmental Justice Claims Seriously, [1998] 28 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,373 (July 1998).
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Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 19647'a as a condition of re-
ceiving environmental grant funding from the federal govern-
ment. 4 The EPA's nondiscrimination policy is designed to en-
sure that federal actions substantially affecting human health
or the environment do not have discriminatory effects based on
race, color, or national origin." The Interim Guidance directs
the EPA's Office of Civil Rights ("OCR"), which considers charg-
es filed under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, to pursue infor-
mal resolution of administrative complaints when possible.
After a complaint is received by the OCR, an investigation will
be conducted to determine if the project at issue would create a
disparate impact on the surrounding minority populations: The
EPA is currently investigating fifteen Title VI complaints. 77 If
a disparate impact is found, the state authority must either
rebut the finding, modify the permit to mitigate the disparate
impact, or provide adequate justification for why the permit
should nonetheless proceed. If the state agency's response is
inadequate, the OCR will then issue a formal written determi-
nation of noncompliance to the recipient and will begin proce-
dures to suspend EPA grant assistance to the agency.75
Although the OCR is directed to pursue informal resolutions
of administrative complaints wherever practicable, the pressure
imposed on state agencies pursuant to these Title VI regula-
tions could lead to increased future emphasis on environmental
justice considerations in DEQ permitting decisions. The EPA's
environmental justice policy could also potentially impact facili-
ty siting, permitting, and other environmental programs in the
Commonwealth.
The implications of the EPA's Title VI policy have caused a
great deal of controversy. As a result, the Administrator of the
EPA recently sent a letter to the Conference of Mayors attempt-
373. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1994).
374. Interim Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Chal-
lenging Permits (last modified Feb. 13, 1998) <http'//es.epa.gov/oeca/oej/titlevi.html>
[hereinafter Interim Guidance].
375. See id. at 1.
376. See id. at 6.
377. See Letter from Carol Browner, EPA Administrator to the U.S. Conference of
Mayors (June 18, 1998) <http:J/www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/html-doc/confinayo.htm> [here-
inafter Letter from EPA].
378. See Interim Guidance, supra note 374, at 6.
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ing to resolve concerns about the impact of Title VI on
Brownfields programs. 7 An EPA advisory committee has
been established to address these issues and provide recommen-
dations to the EPA by December 1998. The EPA plans to issue
final guidance in the spring of 1999.80
B. Endocrine Disruptors
The controversial topic of "endocrine disruptors" may have a
significant role to play in the stringency of cleanup standards
in the future. The 1996 publication of Our Stolen Future, co-
authored by Dr. Theo Colborn, brought the concept of endocrine
disruptors to the forefront of scientific debate.I Endocrine
disruptors are chemicals such as PCBs, dioxins, and many pes-
ticides which interfere with the endocrine system in both hu-
mans and animals, causing abnormal reproductive patterns.82
Based on the notion that an endocrine disruptor's trigger level
for causing reproductive harm would be much lower than a
trigger level for causing cancer, this area of developing science
could have broad implications for environmental standards
traditionally based on risk assessments involving chemical
carcinogenicity." Incorporation of these lower thresholds into
risk assessments would lead to more protective standards. Low-
er thresholds would have wide ranging implications not only for
environmental RCRA and CERCLA cleanup standards, but also
for natural resource damage assessments and water quality
regulations." Emerging environmental legislation addresses
the concept of endocrine disruption through screening and test-
ing pro.visions designed to assess the toxic effects of endocrine
disrupting chemicals. For example, the 1996 Food Quality Pro-
tection Ac"t3 5 and the 1996 amendments to the Safe Drinking
379. See Letter from EPA, supra note 377.
380. See id.
381. THEO COLBORN ET AL., OUR STOLEN FUTURE (1996).
382. See, e.g., Charles W. Henderson, Environment WHO Program Will Oversee
Endocrine Disruptors, CANCER WKLY. PLUS, Apr. 6, 1998.
383. See id.; see also SPECIAL REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ENDOCRINE DISRUPTION:
AN EFFECTS ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS, EPA Doc. No. EPA/630/R-96/012 (Feb. 1997);
Joby Warrick, Proportion of Male Births Down in U.S., Study Says; Pollution Suggest-
ed as Possible Cause, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 1988, at A14.
384. See Disrupting Risks, Hazardous Waste News (BPI), at 121 (Apr. 20, 1998).
385. Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996).
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Water Act 6 require the establishment of screening and test-
ing programs for endocrine disrupting chemicals. 87 In addi-
tion, the EPA is planning to address endocrine disruptors under
the Toxic Substances Control Act (UTSCA7) through the develop-
ment of a screening and testing program to evaluate certain
chemicals for their potential to disrupt the hormonal systems of
humans and animals.3"
C. Public Access to Information
The advent of the Internet has led to increasing legislation
mandating access by the public to environmental information.
In '1997, the General Assembly provided for the development of
an Environmental Information System.389 The resolution re-
quested that the United States Department of Agriculture adopt
a proposal by the Natural Resources Conservation Service,
Virginia's Soil and Water Conservation Districts, -the National
Center for Resource Innovations-Chesapeake, Inc., and the
Fund for Rural American Programs. The proposal would assist
Virginia in developing an environmental information system.
The intent was for Virginia agencies to be able to share infor-
mation and experience with other agencies. Access to this infor-
mation would aid Virginia agencies in making decisions about
environmental policy based on effective socio-economic and agri-
environmental analyses.39
Additionally, legislation was introduced during the 1998 Gen-
eral Assembly mandating that water and air permittees provide
the DEQ with information about equipment malfunctions. 9'
The DEQ would be required to publish the information on the
386. Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
300f to 300j-25 (West Supp. 1997)).
387. See Wendy P. Feiner, Just When You Thought It Was Safe To Go Back in the
Water: A Guide To Complying With the 1996 Amendments To the Safe Drinking Water
Act, 4 ENVTL. L. 193, 205-06 (1997).
388. See TSCA. Four Major Issues Seen Driving Agency Action on Toxics in 1998,
[Jan.] Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 5-24 (Jan. 12, 1998).
389. See H.J. Res. 537, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1997).
390. See id.
391. See S.B. 589, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998).
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Internet in a searchable format for a period of at least two
years. The legislation was soundly defeated, but it is expected
to resurface.
These bills mark a growing trend of legislation aimed at
providing information to the public. The regulated community
should be careful to ensure that such information is provided in
the proper context.
XI. CONCLUSION
In the past two years, many new issues have surfaced that
will impact the regulated community. As technology continues
to change and new information becomes available, the environ-
mental fiel4 is likely to continue to evolve. Specifically, issues
relating to environmental justice, interstate commerce, public
participation, and endocrine disruptors are likely to affect envi-
ronmental regulations in the future.
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